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WHO CARES ABOUT THE
COUNTERFEITERS? HOW THE FIGHT
AGAINST COUNTERFEITING HAS BECOME
AN IN REM PROCESS
STEVEN N. BAKER & MATTHEW LEE FESAKt
INTRODUCTION
The history of American stock car racing is replete with
colorful stories of "bootlegging"1 or the illicit trafficking in
untaxed liquor.2 Prior to the adoption of an income tax, "nearly
75 percent of total federal revenues... was raised from taxes on
t Steven N. Baker is an associate at McGuireWoods LLP; J.D., cum laude, 2007,
Wake Forest University School of Law; B.A., 2003, Brigham Young University. The
views expressed herein are my own and those of my coauthor and do not necessarily
represent the views of McGuireWoods. © Steven N. Baker. Matthew Lee Fesak is an
Assistant United States Attorney, Eastern District of North Carolina, Civil Division;
Captain, United States Army Reserve, Judge Advocate General's Corps; J.D., 2005,
University of Virginia School of Law; B.A., with honors, 2002, University of Virginia.
The views expressed herein are my own and those of my coauthor and do not
necessarily represent the views of the Department of Justice, the Department of the
Army, or the United States of America. © Matthew Lee Fesak. The authors would
like to thank the Hon. Frank D. Whitney, District Judge for the Western District of
North Carolina, for his invaluable insight and expertise into a strange and complex
area of the law.
' See NEAL THOMPSON, DRIVING WITH THE DEVIL: SOUTHERN MOONSHINE,
DETROIT WHEELS, AND THE BIRTH OF NASCAR 61 (2006) ("In the culture of the
South, fathers thought little of sending their twelve- and fourteen-year-old sons out
to deliver a load of moonshine.... NASCAR legend Curtis Turner claimed to have
delivered his first load of whiskey in 1934, at age ten.").
2 In the early part of the twentieth century, bootlegging had a specific meaning
attached to the sale of illicit alcohol. See BLAcK'S LAw DIcTIoNARY 239 (3d ed. 1933)
(defining bootlegging as "A popular designation for the use, possession, or
transportation of liquor in violation of the law"); see also THOMPSON, supra note 1, at
61 ("Bootlegging was initially named for the practice of hiding liquor in a boot."). The
word has now come to possess a broader meaning. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 177
(7th ed. 1999) (defining "bootleg" as "To manufacture, reproduce, or distribute
[something] illegally or without authorization").
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liquor, customs, and tobacco."' Bootleggers, therefore, were a
prime target of law enforcement and evolved to become highly
adept at evading the revenue authorities.4 Although bootleggers
drove ordinary production automobiles to avoid unwanted
suspicion, underneath the hoods of these "stock" car bodies were
the most powerful engines of the day and heavy suspensions to
carry the load of the liquor at high speeds over rudimentary
mountain roads.5 Consequently, bootleggers discovered that
their cars were as good for racing as outrunning the law, so when
the drivers were not running moonshine, they would organize
informal races for bragging rights. Hence, the sport of stock car
racing was born.
Of course, smuggling, of which bootlegging is just a
variation, long predates Prohibition and automobiles.7 As long as
governments have sought to tax and regulate commerce,
bootleggers, counterfeiters, and smugglers have sought to deny
the government its due. Because these disreputable characters
invariably operated underground, governments needed to devise
novel law enforcement techniques and remedies to combat them.
One of the oldest such remedies is property forfeiture, which was
developed in our own legal history through the British Crown's
efforts to enforce its customs and revenue laws in the courts of
3 United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 60 (1993).
4 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 61 ("[Iln the minds of many southern farmers,
moonshining was just an extension of agriculture, and bootlegging no more than
delivering a farm product to market. They saw no reason the IRS should take a
cut.").
I Id. at 34-35 ("In the South, powerful V-8s left many sheriffs deputies in the
dust. And once whiskey mechanics added extra carburetors to the engine and heavy
tires and a stronger suspension to the chassis, a Ford V-8 could travel at a hundred
miles an hour across jagged mountain roads."); id. at 61-62 ("'Moonshiners put
more time, energy, thought and love into their cars than any racers ever will,'
[famous driver Robert Glenn "Junior"] Johnson said later in life. 'Lose on the track
and you go home. Lose with a load of whiskey and you go to jail.' ").
6 Id. at 88; see Meridith Levinson, A Brief History of NASCAR: From Moonshine
Runners to Dale Earnhardt Jr., CIO, Feb. 1, 2006, http://www.cio.comarticle/17142.
See generally JESS CARR, THE SECOND OLDEST PROFESSION: AN INFORMAL
HISTORY OF BOOTLEGGING IN AMERICA 9-27, 84-111 (1972). In England, excise
taxes on liquor date back to 1643. Id. at 8. The term "moonshiner" was first used in
the eighteenth century and applied to smugglers who brought illicit brandy into
England from France or Holland under cover of night. Id. at 27. Attempts by the
British Crown to regulate and tax the molasses and rum trade in America was
roundly ignored by the colonists, helping to spur revolutionary fervor and giving rise
to the libertine spirit that motivated this country's first bootleggers. Id. at 14-16, 29.
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the Admiralty and the Exchequer.' Our founders were well
acquainted with this tradition; the fifth enactment of the First
Congress established this nation's first statutory forfeiture,
providing:
[All goods, wares, and merchandise... landed or discharged [in
violation of the customs laws], shall become forfeited, and may
be seized by any officer of the customs; and where the value
thereof shall amount to four hundred dollars, the vessel, tackle,
apparel and furniture, shall be subject to forfeiture and
seizure.
9
This forfeiture of property, in addition to other fines and
punishments, not only provided an economic disincentive for the
evasion of customs laws, but itself became an important source of
revenue for the new government and helped take the
instrumentalities of criminal activities (for example, naval
vessels and their appurtenances) out of the hands of smugglers. 10
As the new government began levying taxes on domestically
produced goods, including intoxicating liquors, forfeitures also
became an integral part of the enforcement of the revenue laws.1'
Therefore, it is not surprising that many precedent-setting cases
in the law of asset forfeiture involved bootleggers and the
forfeiture of their coveted racing cars. 2
Stock car racing has evolved from these nefarious roots into
a legitimate and successful spectator sport that is organized
under the auspices of the National Association for Stock Car
8 B. FREDERIC WILLIAMS, JR. & FRANK D. WHITNEY, FEDERAL MONEY
LAUNDERING: CRIMES AND FORFEITURES § 10.5.1.4., 368 (1999).
' Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29, 39. See generally WILLIAMS & WHITNEY,
supra note 8, § 10.5.2.
10 WILLIAMS & WHITNEY, supra note 8, § 10.5.2, at 369.
" See Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 199 (laying duties on distilled spirits
and incorporating numerous forfeiture provisions). Excise taxes on liquor were
levied periodically throughout early American history, usually to help pay off war
debt. CARR, supra note 7, at 18, 21. Following the Civil War, an excise tax was again
levied, and the Office of Internal Revenue was established to collect taxes and was
given broad authority to prosecute violators. Id. at 30. By 1880, "federal seizures of
illegal stills were running over an average of one thousand per year." Id. at 37.
12 See, e.g., Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 465 (1926); J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-
Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 508 (1921); cf. Waterloo Distilling Corp. v.
United States, 282 U.S. 577, 578 (1931) (involving the seizure of a distillery and
distilled spirits); Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 396 (1877)
(same).
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Auto Racing, Inc. ("NASCAR"). 13 Every year, NASCAR hosts
millions of fans in conjunction with three main racing series,
which include nearly one hundred races around the country. 4
Every single one of these races is a commercial bonanza, where
NASCAR and its licensed vendors sell just about anything that
can fit a NASCAR logo, including "[k]ey chains, video games,
puzzles, board games, compact discs, stuffed animals, bears,
pens, pencils, note books, books, booklets, post cards, magazines,
posters, banners, binders," and so on. 15  Each one of these
products "displays prominently the names and logos of the
respective companies, drivers, races and/or speedways." 16 It
hardly needs to be said that every single one of these logos,
including the well-known NASCAR logo and accompanying
hologram, is an extremely valuable trademark. The sale of
merchandise at NASCAR events is immensely profitable. 7
In what can only be viewed as an historical irony, NASCAR's
valuable trademarks have become the subject of extensive
counterfeit activity. 18 In an effort to combat this theft of its
intellectual property, NASCAR has brought a civil action under
the Lanham Act,' 9 as amended by the Trademark Counterfeiting
13 THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 6 ("The 'sport' that [driving legend Raymond]
Parks helped create became a multibillion-dollar industry. It evolved from rural,
workingman's domain into an attraction.., for eighty million fans. Today's
NASCAR, still owned by a single family, is a phenomenon, a churning
moneymaker... and the second most popular sport in America, with races that
regularly attract two hundred thousand spectators.").
14 See Complaint, Exhibit 4, Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc. v. Does,
584 F. Supp. 2d 824 (W.D.N.C. 2008) (No. 3:08-cv-44); see also NASCAR Racing
Series (Apr. 28, 2008), http://www.nascar.comnews/features/nascar.series/index.
html.
" Complaint, Exhibit 3, Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc. v. Does, 584
F. Supp. 2d 824 (W.D.N.C. 2008) (No. 3:08-cv-44). NASCAR's full list of examples of
its merchandise contains 129 items, ranging from items one would expect at a live
sporting event (for example, trading cards, bumper stickers, shot glasses, jerseys) to
the less expected (for example, tapestry wall hangings, sleeping bags, elbow pads,
and inflatable pools). Id.
16 Id. 38.
'" See Memorandum for NASCAR et al. at 5, Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto
Racing, Inc. v. Does, 584 F. Supp. 2d 824 (W.D.N.C. 2008) (No. 3:08-cv-44) ("The sale
of [NASCAR's] Merchandise trackside during the 2008 NASCAR season is likely to
generate in excess of $1 billion in gross revenues.").
11 See Eric Spanberg, NASCAR Cracks Down, CHARLOTTE BUS. J., Mar. 14,
2008, available at http://assets.bizjournals.com/charlotte/stories/2008/03/17/story4.
html?page=l.
11 Lanham Act, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified at 15 U.S.C § 1051).
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Act of 1984,20 every year since 2001.21 The Trademark
Counterfeiting Act provides private parties like NASCAR with a
seizure and forfeiture power, much like that employed by the
government to combat NASCAR's forbearers in their own illegal
trade.22 Based upon NASCAR's complaint in 2008, it has, over
the years, "seized hundreds of thousands of items of Counterfeit
Merchandise... [in order] to avoid millions of dollars in lost
sales."2 3
NASCAR has effected these seizures pursuant to
15 U.S.C. § 1116(d), one of the Trademark Counterfeiting Act's
key additions to the Lanham Act.24 Congress felt that the
Lanham Act needed to be revitalized in order to deal effectively
with counterfeiters, as penalties for counterfeiting were "too
small, and too infrequently imposed, to deter counterfeiting
significantly."2  The Lanham Act's inefficacy, when combined
with the "enormous profits to be made by capitalizing on the
reputations, development costs, and advertising efforts of honest
manufacturers, 26 led to what Congress described as "the
20 Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, Pub L. No. 98-473, § 1052, 98 Stat
2178 (1984).
21 See Complaint, Exhibit 4, 47, Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc. v.
Does, 584 F. Supp. 2d 824 (W.D.N.C. 2008) (No. 3:08-cv-44); Nat'l Ass'n for Stock
Car Auto Racing, Inc. v. Does, 584 F. Supp. 2d 824, 828-29 (W.D.N.C. 2008)
(discussing actions since 2003).
22 See S. REP. No. 98-526, at 2 (1984) ("To provide trademark owners with an
effective means of combatting this lawless behavior, the bill provides that under
certain defined circumstances, a private party may obtain a court order to seize
counterfeit goods ....").
23 Complaint, Exhibit 4, 58, Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc. v. Does,
584 F. Supp. 2d 824 (W.D.N.C. 2008) (No. 3:08-cv-44) (emphasis added). In 2008,
NASCAR seized 18,017 items of counterfeit merchandise. Memorandum in Support
of Motion for Entry of Default Judgment for Forfeiture of Seized Counterfeit Goods
and for Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice as To All Other Claims at 2, Nat'l
Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc, v. Does, 584 F. Supp. 2d 824 (W.D.N.C. 2008)
(No. 3:08-cv-44).
24 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1116(d) (West 2009).
[W]ith respect to a violation that consists of using a counterfeit mark in
connection with the sale, offering for sale, or distribution of goods or
services, the court may, upon ex parte application, grant an
order... providing for the seizure of goods and counterfeit marks involved
in such violation.
Id.; NASCAR, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 825 (granting NASCAR's request for an ex parte
seizure pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1116).
25 S. REP. No. 98-526, at 5.
26 Id.
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mushrooming traffic in counterfeit goods and services."27 The
result was an increased measure of criminal penalties for
counterfeiting, but with recognition of the practical reality that
"it is unlikely that busy federal prosecutors will be able to
prosecute more than a fraction of those who traffic in known
fakes."2" Thus, Congress's main goal in passing the Trademark
Counterfeiting Act appears to have been to encourage private
enforcement of the trademark laws,29 including the creation of
mandatory treble damages in situations where the counterfeiting
was demonstrably intentional.3 °
However, traditional civil remedies proved ineffectual in the
past. Counterfeiters were already engaged in a "uniquely
pernicious"31 and "evil"32 activity and would often destroy any
counterfeit goods in their possession the moment they were
placed on notice of legal proceedings.33 Treble damages from a
27 Id. at 2.
28 Id.
29 See id.
30 See id. at 6.
31 Id. at 2.
32 Diane Von Furstenberg Studio v. Snyder, No. 1:06CV1356, 2007 WL 1835276,
at *2 (E.D. Va. June 25, 2007), affd, No. 07-2172, 2008 WL 4280109 (4th Cir. 2008);
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Universal Tel-A-Talk, Inc., No. Civ. A. 96-6961, 1999 WL
285883, at *2 (E.D. Pa. April 26, 1999).
" Much of this is due to the "manner in which counterfeiters operate." Lucas G.
Paglia & Mark A. Rush, End Game: The Ex Parte Seizure Process and the Battle
Against Bootleggers, 4 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 4, 5 (2002).
The majority of counterfeiters are street vendors who peddle their goods
at flea markets, city kiosks, and live entertainment events. These
individuals and groups are usually not incorporated or otherwise formally
organized. Instead, they tend to do business from remote, makeshift
factories and storage centers. Their vans and trucks serve as "moving
warehouses" that travel from event to event, city to city, in search of
unsuspecting consumers.
... If apprised in advance of a pending motion for injunction,
counterfeiters invariably leave with their illicit merchandise and either
relocate to a venue beyond the jurisdiction of the court or simply wait until
their pursuers have abandoned the cause before restarting their illegal
businesses.
Id.; see also Michael D. McCoy & James D. Myers, Ex Parte Seizure Order Practice
After the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, 14 AIPLA Q.J. 237, 240 (1986)
("Traditional procedures and remedies provided little real relief for injured
trademark owners since 'in and out' infringers played fast and loose with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and were often judgment-proof."). Congress
explicitly relied on this inability of former Lanham Act provisions to deal with
counterfeiters, repeating expert testimony that
the victimized plaintiff will be met in court with a version of the following
refrain: "I bought only a few pieces from a man I never saw before and
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few counterfeit products, surely all that will remain after a
counterfeiter has been given notice and opportunity to be heard,
realistically may not be worth the effort and cost of litigation.
How, then, was the trademark owner to obtain meaningful relief?.
The answer to this dilemma was a truly novel creation in the
realm of private commercial litigation 34: An ex parte seizure
process by which a trademark owner "may obtain a court order
directing a law enforcement official to seize counterfeit goods and
related materials without giving advance notice to the party from
whom the goods are seized."35 Congress recognized that it was
providing civil litigants with a powerful tool-the physical
seizure of property prior to any notice or opportunity to be
heard-that is usually the exclusive province of law
enforcement.36 Thus, the ex parte seizure order was born,
creating a process that "would quickly become 'the best weapon
in the fight against counterfeiters,' largely because it enabled
trademark owners to excise counterfeit products from the
marketplace, 'providing the immediate benefits of increased per
capita merchandise sales as well as preserving (for another day)
the reputation and good will the mark embodies.' "31
It is fair to say that this seizure and forfeiture procedure has
been utilized well beyond the wildest expectations of the enacting
Congress, and this trend deserves much greater attention in the
scholarly literature and case law than it has heretofore received.
This Article discusses Congress's creation of the seizure power
within the context of the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984,
other provisions of the Lanham Act, and other contexts in which
one finds seizures and in rem forfeitures, such as admiralty law
whom I have never seen again. All my business was in cash. I do not know
how to locate the man from whom I bought and I cannot remember the
identity of the persons to whom I sold."
S. REP. No. 98-526, at 7 (quoting In re Vuitton et Fils S.A., 606 F.2d 1, 2 (2d Cir.
1979)).
34 We say "novel" for the sake of simplicity, but, in fact, several courts had
already begun to grant such orders. See, e.g., In re Vuitton, 606 F.2d at 1-2; see also
Steven N. Baker, The Never Ending Seizure Order: How Courts Have Granted
Immortality to Congress's Mayfly, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 369, 374-75 (2008)
(discussing how the failure of traditional remedies led courts to grant ex parte
orders).
35 S. REP. No. 98-526, at 6.
36 Recognizing the irregularity and potential danger of granting civil litigants
the seizure power, Congress stated, "Ex parte procedures of this sort, should, of
course, be used with caution in civil cases." Id.
3 Baker, supra note 34, at 375 (quoting Paglia & Rush, supra note 33, at 5-6).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
and modern asset forfeiture statutes. Our goal is to determine
what, exactly, Congress created when it bestowed the seizure
power upon trademark owners, and what implications that has
on the judicial process-from the filing of a counterfeiting lawsuit
through the entry of a final judgment.
Although the Trademark Counterfeiting Act is now well into
its third decade of use, there is remarkably little case law or
commentary concerning seizure orders in civil counterfeiting
actions. According to one commentator, it is,
[iironically, the very ease with which these orders are granted
[that] probably explains the dearth of cases upholding the
procedures .... There must be literally thousands of actions in
which ex parte seizures have been authorized and have been
executed without a hitch. Yet, there are relatively few reported
cases which even discuss ex parte seizures. 38
Congress's main goal in the Trademark Counterfeiting Act, as
expressed in the legislative history, was to provide stronger
monetary penalties for counterfeiters in recognition of the fact
that few will ever be criminally prosecuted. 9 It is the seizure
order, however, that has stolen the show by becoming plaintiffs'
preferred weapon of trademark protection.4 ° NASCAR is the
perfect example of this evolution of the Trademark
Counterfeiting Act's remedies. In the eight years that NASCAR
has brought civil actions under the Trademark Counterfeiting
Act, it has never proceeded to a final judgment or recovered a
3 Jules D. Zalon, Ex Parte Seizure Orders: Don't Kill the Goose That Laid This
Golden Egg!, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 181, 191 (1999).
39 See S. REP. NO. 98-526, at 1, 5-6 (1984) ("[The Act] is designed to provide both
federal prosecutors and trademark owners with essential tools for combatting this
insidious and rapidly growing form of commercial fraud .... In addition to criminal
penalties, the bill would increase the damages available to victims in civil suits
against counterfeiters.").
40 See Paglia, supra note 33, at 5-6 ("In light of the problems confronting
trademark owners, the ex parte seizure process ... represents the best weapon in
the fight against counterfeiting."); see also Michael L. Petrucci, Casenote,
Trademark Law: Vuitton v. White, 945 F. 2d 569 (3d Cir. 1991) and the Ex Parte
Seizure Order in Trademark Counterfeit Litigation: The Trend Must End, 18 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 217, 226 (1992) ("As designed, ex parte seizure orders allow the
prosecution to obtain the evidence before counterfeiters have an opportunity to
dispose of the counterfeit goods. This approach makes seizure orders an effective
means of combatting counterfeiting abuses. As a result, plaintiffs' attorneys often
request ex parte seizure orders in trademark counterfeit litigation.").
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single dollar from counterfeiters. 41 Rather, NASCAR has used
the seizure process to protect its valuable trademarks and
lucrative sales revenues from counterfeiters who dilute its
trademarks and harm consumers with inferior products.42
The procedures for pursuing an in personam judgment and
resulting monetary damages are straightforward and
uncontroversial.43 In contrast, the idea that one civil litigant
may involuntarily seize vast amounts of property from another
civil litigant (hundreds of thousands of items by NASCAR's
count), voluntarily dismiss his counterfeiting case before
proceeding to a final judgment on the merits, and then destroy
that property without giving notice to potential owners, is one
that is fraught with complex legal issues.44 This Article discusses
these issues by attempting to determine whether the seizure
process is part of the in personam action against the
counterfeiter or really a distinct in rem action against the
counterfeit items themselves. The answer to this question will
affect the course of the seizure order from start to finish,
determining the amount of due process that must be accorded to
the potential owners of the seized property, and the procedures
that must be followed in order to comply with the Fourth
Amendment.45  Trademark owners may denounce these
issues as "academic" or "purely hypothetical" given the fact that
the modern counterfeiter rarely, if ever, appears in court to
defend himself.46 Nevertheless, those committed to the law and
41 See Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc. v. Does, 584 F. Supp. 2d 824,
828-29 (W.D.N.C. 2008) ("[NASCAR has] followed a different path [from that
contemplated in the Trademark Counterfeiting Act] in years past[,] ... always
voluntarily dismissing the case after nearly a year of seizing counterfeit
goods [,] ... without ever having obtained a final judgment.").
42 Id. (noting that from 2003 to 2007, NASCAR seized counterfeit goods from
defendants and later disposed of them through charitable donations and overseas
distribution).
4 Rauch v. Day and Night Mfg. Corp., 576 F.2d 697, 699-700 (6th Cir. 1978)
(discussing how personal jurisdiction can be obtained over a defendant).
4 The power to destroy counterfeit property, as discussed in further detail infra,
is found at 15 U.S.C. § 1118.
45 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
46 See Paglia & Rush, supra note 33, at 5 ("[C]ounterfeiters benefit from
practical immunity to standard cease-and-desist approaches and civil litigation.").
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its just application never apply such epithets to the proper
determination of constitutional rights. Furthermore, a court
cannot abdicate its duty to uphold the law and consider the
rights of potential third parties who inevitably will be bound by
its judgments. In addition, from a practical standpoint,
Lanham Act plaintiffs should be mindful of the due process
rights of their adversaries, lest they be exposed to liability for
any unconstitutional deprivations for which they are responsible.
I. THE NATURE OF AN IN REM SEIZURE AND FORFEITURE
The idea that governments can and do seize property is, of
course, as old as government itself.4" It was the power of the
federal government to seize property that led the Founders to
protect "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their... houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable ... seizures." 9  A
warrant for such property seizures was only to issue "upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the ... things to be seized."" The
standards for probable cause and property seizures under the
Fourth Amendment have been litigated since the founding of the
nation51 and need not be discussed in great detail here.52 Suffice
47 See NASCAR, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 828 ("It appears unlikely that any
Defendant will ever appear to contest Plaintiffs' motions and the Court's orders in
this case. Nevertheless, it remains the Court's responsibility to protect the due
process and property rights of all the currently named Defendants and other
Defendants as yet unknown.").
4 See, e.g., THE MAGNA CARTA art. 32 (limiting the king's possession of forfeited
lands to one year and one day, after which they were to be handed over to the local
lord).
49 U.S. CONST. amend. TV. We have, of course, excised the more commonly
discussed aspect of the Fourth Amendment regarding unlawful searches, as this
Article is concerned only with seizures.
50 Id.
5 See, e.g., Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 348 (1813)
(discussing the probable cause standard for property seizures). The Supreme Court
has continually revised the precise standards for probable cause, culminating in
what is now the "totality-of-the-circumstances" test of Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
233 (1983).
52 In any event, the Trademark Counterfeiting Act's requirement that the court
find that "the applicant is likely to succeed," 15 U.S.C.A. § 1116(d)(4)(B)(iii) (West
2008), is undoubtedly a higher standard than probable cause, which has been
described as "reasonable ground for belief of guilt, supported by less than prima
facie proof but more than mere suspicion." United States v. $95,945.18, U.S.
Currency, 913 F.2d 1106, 1110 (4th Cir.1990) (quoting United States v. $364,960 In
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it to say that the seizure authority is sufficiently intrusive that
the Founders felt it necessary to limit its reach.53
A seizure is the taking possession of property through legal
process. 4 This must, at the outset, be distinguished from a
forfeiture, which is the actual divestiture of legal title in property
by operation of law.55 The Fourth Amendment's requirements of
probable cause, particularity, and timeliness limit the
government's power to wrest possession of private property.56
Likewise, the Due Process Clause, which provides that no person
may "be deprived of. .. property, without due process of law,"5 7
acts as a substantive limitation on the government's power to
forfeit a private party's interest in that property.58
Although the concepts of seizure and forfeiture are
intertwined and often occur in conjunction with one another,
their differences are important and must be properly understood
in the broader context of in personam (against a person) versus
in rem (against a thing) actions. When conceptualizing the
typical police seizure, one usually thinks of collecting evidence of
a crime pursuant to a warrant. This type of seizure is ancillary
to a prosecution in personam, where the seized property plays
but an evidentiary role in determining the personal defendant's
U.S. Currency, 661 F.2d 319, 323 (5th Cir. 1981)); NASCAR, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 827
n.1; see WILLIAMS & WHITNEY, supra note 8, § 13.7.1, at 740-43.
r This wariness of seizures applied to forfeitures as well, which the Founders
generally viewed with disfavor. See Steven L. Schwarcz & Alan E. Rothman, Civil
Forfeiture: A Higher Form of Commercial Law?, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 287, 291 (1993)
("In America, civil forfeiture was until recently infrequently used. Forfeitures were
largely disfavored, primarily because the government's seizure of private property
was a leading source of tension between the former colonists and the British
Crown.").
- See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1389 (8th ed. 2004).
"' See id. at 677.
Probable cause has historically been required for seizures. See The Apollon, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 372 (1824) ("The next question.., is, whether there was, is [sic]
this case, probable cause of seizure."). There is, however, an issue as to when
probable cause must be demonstrated in the context of a civil forfeiture. See infra
note 268 and accompanying text.
57 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
5' See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 62 (1993)
("Unless exigent circumstances are present, the Due Process Clause requires the
Government to afford notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before seizing
real property subject to civil forfeiture."). Some commentators have argued that
constitutional protections are insufficiently applied in the realm of civil forfeiture
statutes. See Schwarcz & Rothman, supra note 53, at 288 ("Ironically, forfeiture of
commercial assets is an inadvertent attack on private property rights perpetrated by
the very governmental officials who are sworn to protect and defend those rights.").
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legal liability.59 The mere seizure of property to be used as
evidence, however, does not entail its ultimate forfeiture.60 As a
matter of practice, evidence that remains unclaimed at the
conclusion of a trial may be treated as abandoned property, and,
therefore, destroyed in accordance with the rules and customs of
the jurisdiction.6' Also, any seized property that is "contraband
per se"-property that is inherently illegal to possess (most
commonly drugs)-is deemed forfeited and may be destroyed
without any formal legal process.62 In the vast majority of cases,
however, a true forfeiture results only as a consequence of some
legal process separate from the seizure itself.63
In the context of in personam proceedings, therefore, seizure
may amount to nothing more than an evidence-gathering device.
But a seizure may also play a different, very distinct role.
Returning to the typical criminal prosecution, it should not be
forgotten that the actual arrest of a person to bring him within
the jurisdiction of the court constitutes a seizure under the
Fourth Amendment. 64 Likewise, in an in rem action, where the
named defendant is a piece of property, the property must be
brought within the jurisdiction of the court before a judgment
affecting that property may be rendered.6  The formal arrest or
seizure of the property is an analogous process for obtaining
,9 Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc. v. Does, 584 F. Supp. 2d 824, 828
(W.D.N.C. 2008) ("[TIhe seizure order, as conceived of by Congress, is meant to serve
as an evidentiary mechanism, preserving evidence for trial that might otherwise be
destroyed or concealed by the counterfeiter if placed on notice of the litigation.").
60 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(g) (providing a mechanism for the rightful owners of
property seized as evidence to move the court for its return).
61 See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 50.21 (2009) (providing procedures for destroying drug
evidence that is in the custody of federal law enforcement authorities).
62 See WILLIAMS & WHITNEY, supra note 8, § 13.4.1.
6 See, e.g., Return of Seized Prop. v. United States, 625 F. Supp. 2d 949, 952-53
(C.D. Cal. 2009) (finding that government has a statutory obligation to demonstrate
probable cause that property was related to a criminal offense before it can institute
a forfeiture action); In re Vitta, 409 B.R. 6, 13 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009) (asserting that
criminal forfeiture "is dependent upon and related to the criminal proceedings
brought against the criminal defendant") (citations omitted).
64 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968); see also WILLIAMS & WHITNEY, supra
note 8, § 13.6.1, at 723 ("[Service of process] harkens to the day of the common law
when the defendant had to [be] brought physically into court before the court had
any jurisdiction to enter a judgment binding on him.").
" See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R § 302(a)(4) (McKinney 2009).
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jurisdiction over the res.66 As such, it functions as a condition
precedent to an in rem forfeiture but does not itself constitute the
forfeiture.67
Historically, the process for adjudicating a forfeiture could
also be either in personam or in rem. This distinction is well
explained by Justice Story in The Palmyra.8 Under English
common law, a person who was convicted of a felony "forfeited his
goods and chattels to the crown."69 This type of forfeiture was a
collateral consequence of the felony conviction-felons at that
time in England were automatically disqualified from owning
property-but bore no relation to whether the property was
somehow implicated in the wrongdoing.70 The First Congress
abolished this draconian practice, 7' but recently and in response
to the modern practicalities of fighting the war on drugs and
organized crime, Congress has authorized new punishments in
this tradition with the enactment of criminal forfeitures. 2 Solely
as a consequence of the defendant's criminal conviction, he is
deemed to forfeit all interest in the proceeds of his crimes or
other property with a nexus to the offense of conviction. 3 These
types of forfeitures are adjudicated contemporaneously with a
66See The Brig Ann, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 289, 291 (1815).
In erder [sic] to institute and perfect proceedings in rem, it is necessary
that the thing should be actually or constructively within the reach of the
Court. It is actually within its possession when it is submitted to the
process of the Court; it is constructively so, when, by a seizure, it is held to
ascertain and enforce a right of forfeiture which can alone be decided bya
[sic] judicial decree in rem .... [Blefore judicial cognizance can attach upon
a forfeiture in rem,... there must be a seizure; for until seizure it is
impossible to ascertain what is the competent forum.
Id.; see also WILLIAMS & WHITNEY, supra note 8, § 13.6.1, at 723.
67 See FED. R. Civ. P. SUPP. R. C(3)(a), G(3); DAVID B. SMITH, PROSECUTION AND
DEFENSE OF FORFEITURE CASES § 9.01[21 (2009) ("[A] seizure is a condition
precedent to the filing of a forfeiture complaint and a sine qua non of the court's
jurisdiction.").
61 See 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 1, 14-15 (1827).
69 See id. at 14.
70 See WILLIAMS & WHITNEY, supra note 8, § 10.5.1.1.
7' Act of Jan. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 24, 1 Stat. 99, 117 ("[N]o conviction or
judgment... shall work.., any forfeiture of estate.") (codified at former
18 U.S.C. § 3563) repealed by Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (Oct. 12, 1984).
72 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 982 (2006) (authorizing courts to order forfeiture of
property by persons convicted of specific offenses); 21 U.S.C. § 853 (2006) (defining
property subject to criminal forfeiture).
73 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (2006) (imposing criminal forfeiture penalties for
persons convicted of racketeering activity); 21 U.S.C. § 853 (defining property
subject to criminal forfeiture).
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trial on the guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant and are
executed as a part of his sentence."4 However, because criminal
prosecutions are in personam and not in rem, a criminal
forfeiture that is obtained through this procedure affects only the
named defendant's interest in forfeited property and does not
resolve issues of title with respect to the rest of the world.7 5 This
feature of in personam forfeitures has important implications
that will be discussed later.
By contrast, an in rem forfeiture is one in which "[tihe thing
is... primarily considered as the offender, or rather the offence
is attached primarily to the thing."7 6 In rem proceedings began
mostly in admiralty,77 where the thing seized was often a vessel
that was used for smuggling in violation of customs and revenue
78 in1laws, involved in the crime of piracy,79 or that had been seized
by a privateer during a time of war. °  In rem forfeitures saw
74 See United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 396 (2d Cir. 1979).
RICO is apparently the first modem federal statute to impose forfeiture as
a criminal sanction directly on an individual defendant.... However, what
is innovative about RICO is not that it imposes forfeiture as a consequence
of criminal activity, but rather that it imposes it directly on an individual
as part of a criminal prosecution rather than in a separate proceeding in
rem against the property subject to forfeiture.
Id.; see also WILLIAMS & WHITNEY, supra note 8, § 13.14, at 826.
" See United States v. Tit's Cocktail Lounge, 873 F.2d 141, 143 (7th Cir. 1989).
76 See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 1, 14 (1827).
77 See Damon Garett Saltzburg, Note, Real Property Forfeitures as a Weapon in
the Government's War on Drugs: A Failure To Protect Innocent Ownership Rights, 72
B.U. L. REv. 217, 220 (1992) ("Although English common law made widespread use
of forfeiture, early forfeiture law in this country was limited primarily to admiralty
law, which forfeited ships and their contents used in violation of maritime law.
Because ship owners were often difficult to locate, these actions proceeded in rem.").
There were, however, early cases involving in rem forfeitures outside the realm of
admiralty. See, e.g., Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 401 (1877).
[Tihe offence. . . is attached primarily to the distillery, and the real and
personal property used in connection with the same, without any regard
whatsoever to the personal misconduct or responsibility of the owner,
beyond what necessarily arises from the fact that he leased the property to
the distiller, and suffered it to be occupied and used by the lessee as a
distillery.
Id.
7 See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886).
,9 Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 233 (1844) ("The vessel
which commits the aggression is treated as the offender, as the guilty instrument or
thing to which the forfeiture attaches, without any reference whatsoever to the
character or conduct of the owner.").
80 See, e.g., The Mary, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 126, 126 (1815).
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more expansive use during the Civil War 81  and during
Prohibition.8 2  More recently, in rem forfeitures have been
employed as an integral part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970,3 the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986, 4 the 1990 and 1992 amendments to that Act, 5 and other
statutes involving the war on drugs and organized crime.86 As a
more modern Supreme Court has stated, a true in rem
proceeding is one in which "[i]t is the property which is proceeded
against, and, by resort to a legal fiction, held guilty and
condemned as though it were conscious instead of inanimate and
insentient."8 7  Although in rem proceedings are often separate
81 See Schwarcz & Rothman, supra note 53, at 291 ("During the Civil War,
forfeiture saw extensive use, initially in the confiscation of rebels' property, and later
in the confiscation of property of Southern sympathizers. The Supreme Court
subsequently upheld forfeiture under a broad construction of the government's
military power.").
82 See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933); National Prohibition Act, ch.
85, 41 Stat. 305 (1919); Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 119 (1923)
(applying the National Prohibition Act's administrative instructions, which stated
that "[e]xcessive or surplus liquor stores ... are subject to seizure and forfeiture").
' See Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 511, 84 Stat. 1236, 1276-78 (codified as amended at
21 U.S.C. § 881 (2006)).
84 See Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1366(a), 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-35 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 981(a)(1)(A) (West 2009)).
1 See Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 103, 104 Stat. 4789, 4874 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C.A. § 981(a)(1)(C) (West 2009)); Pub. L. No. 102-393, 106 Stat. 1729, 1788
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 981(a)(1)(C) (West 2009)); Pub. L. No. 102-519,
§ 104(a), 106 Stat. 3385 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 981(a)(1)(F) (West
2009)); see Schwarcz & Rothman, supra note 53, at 292-93; Saltzburg, supra note
77, at 221-23.
" See, e.g., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,
18 U.S.C. § 1963 (2006). The current rules and procedures for civil asset forfeitures
can be found within the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000. 18 U.S.C. § 983
(2006).
87 United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 275 (1996) (quoting Various Items of
Pers. Prop. v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 284 (1931)); see also Republic Nat. Bank
of Miami v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, 87 (1992) ("The fictions of in rem forfeiture
were developed primarily to expand the reach of the courts and to furnish remedies
for aggrieved parties."); Von Hofe v. United States, 492 F.3d 175, 184 (2d Cir. 2007).
A civil in rem forfeiture.., proceeds against the property itself under the
legal fiction that "the thing is primarily the offender." The law "ascrib[es] to
the property a certain personality, a power of complicity and guilt in the
wrong." Like imprisonment, which incapacitates convicted criminals,
forfeiture may be said to incapacitate contraband.
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States., 254
U.S. 505, 510, 511 (1921)). This legal fiction is rather ancient, as summarized by the
Supreme Court:
The "guilty property" theory behind in rem forfeiture can be traced to the
Bible, which describes property being sacrificed to God as a means of
749
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and distinct from in personam proceedings, they are not
necessarily exclusive. Justice Story recognized as much, stating,
"Many cases exist, where the forfeiture for acts done attaches
solely in rem, and there is no accompanying penalty in personam.
Many cases exist, where there is both a forfeiture in rem and a
personal penalty."8
8
Conceptually, an in rem judgment is unique in that the
judgment "binds the whole world and not just the persons who
are served, receive actual notice, or enter an appearance."89 For
that reason, due process requires that all who might claim an
interest in the property that is the subject of litigation receive
adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. In the original
admiralty context, notice of an in rem proceeding was "served"
upon the thing itself.9 ° In other words, the world was placed on
constructive notice of the proceeding by virtue of the fact that
something had been seized. Chief Justice Marshall explained
this principle in The Mary91 :
Where... proceedings are against the person, notice is served
personally, or by publication; where they are in rem, notice is
served upon the thing itself. This is necessarily notice to all
those who have any interest in the thing, and is reasonable
because... it is the part of common prudence for all those who
have any interest in it, to guard that interest by persons who
are in a situation to protect it. Every person, therefore, who
could assert any title to the [vessel], has constructive notice of
her seizure, and may fairly be considered as a party to the
[action] .92
In some of the Supreme Court's more recent statements on
the subject, the Court has softened the legal fiction espoused in
the early forfeiture cases, recognizing the practical reality that
atoning for an offense. See Exodus 21:28. In medieval Europe and at
common law, this concept evolved into the law of deodand, in which
offending property was condemned and confiscated by the church or the
Crown in remediation for the harm it had caused.
United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 330 n.5 (1998). In addition to these
biblical and mediaeval roots, the in rem fiction "has a venerable history in our case
law." Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 615 (1993).
8 The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 1, 9 (1827).
89 WILLIAMS & WHITNEY, supra note 8, § 13.6, at 722; see also The Mary, 13 U.S.
(9 Cranch) 126, 144 (1815) ("The whole world, it is said, are parties in an admiralty
cause; and, therefore, the whole world is bound by the decision.").
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"[aill proceedings, like all rights, are really against persons,"93
meaning that while property may be the subject of an in rem suit,
it is those persons with an interest in the property who are
ultimately affected by the judgment. Thus, mere notice upon the
thing itself may no longer be constitutionally sufficient;94 rather,
adequate notice must be "reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of
the action."9 5
The Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims
and Asset Forfeiture Actions ("Supplemental Rules") reflect this
progression of the law and impose additional safeguards and
assurances of due process for in rem litigation. For example,
Rule G of the Supplemental Rules applies to "a forfeiture action
in rem arising from a federal statute" and provides the
procedural requirements of such an action. 6  Some key
provisions are: (1)the complaint must "be verified... describe
the property with reasonable particularity," state the location of
the property, and provide sufficient details to support a
"reasonable belief" that the complainant will prevail;97 (2)the
seizure must be executed by a United States Marshal or another
officer of the United States, someone under contract with the
United States, or someone appointed by the court;98 (3) the
seizure must take place within the district, unless otherwise
provided for by statute;99 and (4) the various methods of giving
notice to potential claimants-publication for unknown claimants
and direct notice to known claimants. 100 The relevance of these
specific requirements to determining the true nature of a
Lanham Act seizure and forfeiture is discussed in Section III.
9 Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 450 (1982) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186, 207 n.22 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
4 See id. at 451.
9r Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
9 FED. R. Civ. P. SuPP. R. G.
9Id. GW2(a-(f).
98 Id. G(3)(c)(i).
99 Id. G(3)(c)(iii).100 Id. G(4).
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II. THE TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING ACT OF 1984 AS AN IN
PERSONAM STATUTE
As with any statute, the first step in understanding the
Lanham Act and the later additions within the Trademark
Counterfeiting Act of 1984 is "to read and examine the text of the
act and draw inferences concerning the meaning from its
composition and structure."' Furthermore, when necessary to
construe an ambiguous statute, the "first extrinsic aid" to which
courts will turn is the legislative history. 10 2 The structure of the
Lanham Act, both before and after it was amended by the
Trademark Counterfeiting Act, and the legislative history
surrounding those enactments clearly contemplate an action for
the purpose of obtaining traditional in personam remedies, such
as injunctive relief and money damages.
First, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 states, "Any person who shall,
without the consent of the registrant.., reproduce, counterfeit,
copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark... shall be liable in
a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter
provided." 103 Both the reference to the "person" and to personal
liability tend to indicate an in personam action. By contrast,
statutes that provide for an in rem action are almost universally
couched in distinctive in rem language. For example, the general
civil forfeiture statute, 18 U.S.C. § 981, employs language
condemning property that itself has been tainted by its
involvement in criminal activity10 4 and operates without any
finding of personal liability of the owner. 05 Likewise, civil
forfeitures brought pursuant to § 981 and similar authority are
101 NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:1 (7th ed., 2008).
'02 See id. § 48:4.
103 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
104 18 U.S.C.A. § 981(a)(1) (West 2009) ("The following property is subject to
forfeiture to the United States.") (emphasis added).
105 WILLIAMS & WHITNEY, supra note 8, § 13.1, at 657-58. Although
18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(1) (2006) does provide a limited "innocent owner" defense to
forfeiture, the claimant must demonstrate this affirmative defense by a
preponderance of the evidence. § 983(d)(1).
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properly brought as a civil in rem action for libel 10 6 and typically
styled "U.S., plaintiff v. Property, defendant-in-rem. "
1°7
The "remedies" referred to in 15 U.S.C. § 1114 appear in
§ 1116, § 1117 and, arguably, § 1118.108 Of these, only the
seizure and forfeiture provisions found in § 1116(d) and § 1118
could be cast either as in personam-creating a novel discovery
tool for private litigants, similar to that possessed by law
enforcement, to aid in the successful prosecution of their other in
personam claims-or in rem-creating a new substantive remedy
for trademark infringement unto itself."9  Otherwise, the
remedies for trademark infringement created by Congress are
distinctively in personam."0
Section 1117 provides the monetary damages that represent
the bulk of the Trademark Counterfeiting Act's civil remedies for
counterfeiting."' When a trademark owner demonstrates
intentional counterfeiting, he is entitled to three times the
amount of the defendant's profits or the damages sustained by
the plaintiff, whichever is greater, along with the costs of the
action and reasonable attorney's fees." 2  This mandatory" 3
trebling of damages for intentional counterfeiting was another
addition of the Trademark Counterfeiting Act. Statutory
damages of not less than $1000 or more than $200,000 per
counterfeit mark are also available." 4 These monetary damages
are the epitome of an in personam remedy and were the central
focus of the legislative history." 5 Specifically, the report filed by
'0 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2461(b) (West 2009) ("[W]henever a forfeiture of property is
prescribed as a penalty for violation of an Act of Congress ... such forfeiture may be
enforced by libel in admiralty... [or] a proceeding by libel which shall conform as
near as may be to proceedings in admiralty.").
107 WILLIAMS & WHITNEY, supra note 8, § 13.9.1.1.
108 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1118 (2006); 15 U.S.C.A §§ 1116-1117 (West 2009).
109 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1116(d); 15 U.S.C. § 1118.
110 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 1117 (describing profits, damages, costs of the action,
attorney fees, treble damages, and statutory damages as remedies for violation of a
registered mark).
111 See id.
112 See id. § 1117(b).
113 The court may still decline to treble damages, but must show "extenuating
circumstances." Id.
114 See id. § 1117(c). These statutory damages were recently doubled to their
current amount by the Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual
Property Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-403, § 104, 122 Stat. 4256, 4259 (2008).
115 Expert commentary on the Trademark Counterfeiting Act's remedies states
that "all the major remedies are available for infringement of a trademark-
restitution, injunction, and damages." 2 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 6.4(2)
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the Senate Judiciary Committee states that the primary purpose
of the Trademark Counterfeiting Act is "[t]o encourage private
enforcement... [by] authoriz[ing] trademark owners to bring
suit against trademark counterfeiters for treble damages."116
Section 1116 provides injunctive relief for the registrant,
providing that federal courts "shall have power to grant
injunctions, according to the principles of equity and upon such
terms as the court may deem reasonable," to prevent a violation
of the Lanham Act. 1 7 This too is a quintessential in personam
remedy intended to compel or restrain action by the personal
defendant."1 But § 1116 also contains a peculiar addition above
and beyond the hitherto ineffective injunctive remedy. Under
§ 1116(d), the court may "grant an order... providing for the
seizure" of certain items, including the "goods and counterfeit
marks involved in such violation," "the means of making such
marks," and "records documenting the manufacture, sale, or
receipt of things involved in such violation."" 9 Such a seizure
order is to be sought through "ex parte application" of the
Lanham Act plaintiff and is to be issued by the court pursuant to
"an order under subsection (a)," which is the provision that vests
courts with the power to grant injunctive relief.2 ' Thus, it is a
fair inference that the drafters of § 1116(d) believed that a
seizure order would be requested and issued part and parcel with
an application for temporary restraining order pursuant to Rule
65(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which would have a
similar duration to a seizure order'2 ' and may also be issued on
(2d ed. 1993). Indeed, under the heading "Additional Relief," Dobbs states nothing of
the seizure and destruction of counterfeit marks, instead referring only to attorney's
fees, treble damages, and the fact that courts will not award punitive damages. Id. It
is only in the section labeled "Injunctive Relief' that one finds a discussion of seizure
and destruction. Id. § 6.4(5).
116 S. REP. No. 98-526, at 2 (1984).
117 15 U.S.C.A. § 1116(a) (West 2009).
116 "An injunction suit is an action in personam and operates against persons
and not property." Armour & Co. v. Miller, 91 F.2d 521, 525 (8th Cir. 1937)
(emphasis added).
119 15 U.S.C.A. § 1116(d)(1)(A).
120 Id.
121 Section 1116(d)(5)(C) provides that the time period for executing the seizure
order shall not exceed seven days. Id. § 1116(d)(5)(C). By comparison, a temporary
restraining order expires at any time set by the court not to exceed ten days, see
FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)(2), and a search or seizure warrant issued in a criminal case
must also be executed within ten days. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(A)(i). Absent
congressional action, effective December 1, 2009, the execution time for a temporary
[Vol. 83:735
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an ex parte basis 122 upon a plaintiffs showing, among other
things, of exigent circumstances and a likelihood of success on
the merits. 2 ' This similarity seems to lend further support for
the conclusion that the seizure authority is essentially tied to the
court's in personam jurisdiction over a personal defendant.
Furthermore, the legislative history rather explicitly ties the
seizure process to the perceived need for Lanham Act plaintiffs to
preserve evidence in furtherance of their in personam claims. As
stated in the Senate Judiciary Committee's report: "The reason
for this provision is that many counterfeiters, once given notice
that their fraudulent operations have been discovered, will
immediately dispose of the counterfeit goods and make it
impossible for the trademark owner ever to bring them to
justice."'24 As further elaborated in Congress's Joint Statement
on the Trademark Counterfeiting Act, "The purpose of the ex
restraining order and search and seizure warrant will be changed from ten days to
fourteen days. Order Approving Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedures, Mar. 26, 2009; Order Approving Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Mar. 26, 2009.
122 FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1); see Baker, supra note 34, at 381.
123 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(4)(B) ("The court shall not grant such an
application unless . . . the court finds that it clearly appears from specific facts that
[inter alia] ... (iii) the applicant is likely to succeed in showing that the person
against whom seizure would be ordered used a counterfeit mark in connection with
the sale, offering for sale, or distribution of goods or services; (iv) an immediate and
irreparable injury will occur if such seizure is not ordered; ... (vi) the harm to the
applicant of denying the application outweighs the harm to the legitimate interests
of the person against whom seizure would be ordered of granting the application;
and (vii) the person against whom seizure would be ordered, or persons acting in
concert with such person, would destroy, move, hide, or otherwise make such matter
inaccessible to the court, if the applicant were to proceed on notice to such person."),
with Delgado v. P.R. State Elections Comm'n, 689 F. Supp. 40, 41 (D.P.R. 1988)
(citations omitted) ("To prevail in a request for a temporary restraining order,
petitioners must demonstrate that immediate and irreparable injury will result
before the adverse party is notified, a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits,
and that the possible harm to plaintiffs outweighs any possible harm to the
defendants and to the public from the injunctive relief sought."). See also 2 DAN B.
DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 6.4(5) (2d ed. 1993) ("One reason why a TRO is justified
in many cases is that unless it issues, the defendant is likely to destroy or secrete
goods, or will otherwise irrevocably defeat the plaintiffs claim. Under the seizure
statute, such dangers are not merely one reason for granting the order but are an
essential requirement.").
124 S. REP. No. 98-526, at 2-3 (1984).
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parte seizure provision is to provide victims of trademark
counterfeiting with a means of ensuring that the courts are able
to exercise their jurisdiction effectively in counterfeiting cases." 125
It is the function of the seizure order qua discovery tool that
makes many of the essential features of the seizure process
understandable and workable. For example, if Congress
intended the seizure order as a substantive remedy unto itself,
one wonders why the seizure authority extends to "records
documenting the manufacture, sale, or receipt of things involved
in such violation,"26 the seizure of which provides a trademark
plaintiff with little benefit aside from its evidentiary value.
Similarly, the ex parte nature of a seizure order and the strict
seven-day statutory limitation on its duration1 27 make sense only
if it is construed as a tool "to preserve the evidence necessary to
bring trademark counterfeiters to justice." 12' After all, once one
seizure has been effected and the in personam defendant has
been personally served with notice of the lawsuit,'29 the
trademark plaintiff necessarily loses the element of surprise that
Congress believed would make the ex parte seizure order such an
effective tool for preventing the spoliation of evidence. By
contrast, the contemporary trend of courts to extend seizure
orders beyond this seven-day limit,130 notwithstanding the
statutory proscription, attests to the fact that the seizure process
is no longer being justified as a mechanism to preserve evidence
but rather has come of age as a remedy unto itself.
Finally, § 1118 provides that after a Lanham Act violation
"shall have been established," the trademark owner may seek an
order that any property subject to seizure "be delivered up and
destroyed."1 3' In an effort to read the statute in harmony as an
125 130 CONG. REC. H12080 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1984), reprinted in J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, 7 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION app. A8, at 20
(4th ed. West 2009).
126 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1)(A).
127 Id. § 1116(d)(5)(C); 130 CONGR. REC. H31679 (Oct. 10, 1984) ("[Tlhe court
must indicate the period during which the seizure order is to be carried out-a
period that may not be longer than 7 days.").
11 In re Lorillard Tobacco Co., 370 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation
omitted); see also Baker, supra note 34, at 376-78.
11 Section 1116(d)(9) requires that the law enforcement agent acting in
conjunction with the trademark owner effect service of process at the same time the
seizure order is executed.
130 See Baker, supra note 34, at 382-87 (collecting cases).
131 15 U.S.C. § 1118 (2006).
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exclusively in personam statute, it could be argued that § 1118 is
not a "remedy" under § 1114, but rather a procedural tying of
loose ends at the conclusion of a case. 32 While textually
plausible, this reading ignores the practical realities of how
trademark owners, including NASCAR, are using the § 1116(d)
seizure and § 1118 destruction authority: Namely, as a sword to
cull the marketplace of counterfeit merchandise, not merely as a
shield against the intentional spoliation of evidence. 3 3 Because
the seizure order has become ubiquitous in trademark
enforcement litigation, a result that Congress almost surely did
not intend, 3 4 it is clear that trademark-owning plaintiffs have
come to rely on the seizure order as a means of obtaining
meaningful relief, with the forfeiture and destruction of the
counterfeit goods as the ultimate expression of that remedy.
Under this practical reality, the destruction of goods as a remedy
unto itself looks more like an action taken against the thing, not
the person, and would, therefore, fall under the rubric of an in
rem action.
From all this, it is tempting to say that the Trademark
Counterfeiting Act provides exclusively in personam remedies
and that the legislative history supports the idea of the
Trademark Counterfeiting Act as solely in personam. And yet,
the nagging question of how to classify the seizure process
remains. Congress may have intended to create a shield against
the spoliation of evidence, but what currently exists is something
that Congress may not have intended: The evolution of what
132 Most local rules, for example, provide for the routine destruction of
unclaimed evidence at the conclusion of any action. See, e.g., W.D.N.C. L. CIV. R.
79.1(B)-(C) (providing that, once proceedings have ended, any exhibit in the custody
of the court, including assets such as narcotics, firearms, jewelry, liquor, and other
"articles of high monetary value," "may be returned to the parties or destroyed by
the Clerk of Court").
133 See, e.g., Paglia & Rush, supra note 33, at 5, 10 (stating that the purpose of
the seizure order is to "excise [counterfeit] products from the marketplace" and that
the "primary objective of the counterfeiting victim [is] to remove the infringing
materials from the marketplace"); Gabrielle Levin, Desperate Times, Desperate
Measures? Reconceptualizing Ex Parte Seizure Orders To More Effectively Fight the
War on Trademark Counterfeiting, 14 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 171, 175 (2006)
(stating that the seizure order "enables a counterfeiting victim to protect her
trademark rights by immediately removing the allegedly infringing goods from
commerce").
13 The Senate Judiciary Committee report referred to the newly minted ex
parte seizure order as "an extraordinary remedy, which must be used sparingly and
only as needed." S. REP. No. 98-526, at 15 (1984).
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appears to be an in personam statute, calling for injunctive relief,
monetary damages, or both, into one in which both injunctive
relief and monetary damages are considered ineffective, and only
the seizure and destruction of counterfeit goods will suffice.'35
III. SEIZING AND DESTROYING COUNTERFEIT MARKS: THE
EVOLUTION OF AN EVIDENTIARY MECHANISM INTO AN IN REM
PROCEDURE
As seen in the previous Section, the Trademark
Counterfeiting Act was written as-and was intended to be-an
in personam statute. Congress clearly expressed its intentions
that courts grant trademark owners strict monetary penalties-
in the form of mandatory treble damages 136-and injunctive
relief.137  Both of these remedies focus upon the counterfeiter
himself, hence, their classification as in personam. This neat
package, however, begins to unravel upon closer review. First
there is the seizure order itself, unusual at best within an in
personam context. Then there is the conclusion of the action:
The destruction of the counterfeit property. Recalling from
Section I that a seizure divests a person only of possessory rights
in property, the court-ordered destruction of property under
§ 1118 presupposes that the prior owner has actually been
divested of legal title; in other words, that a forfeiture has
implicitly occurred. 138 Then there are additional aspects of the
statute and legislative history, which this Section shall explore,
that make the initially satisfying in personam reading become
less So. 131 Finally, there is the practical application of the seizure
and destruction process, 4 ° one that leaves little doubt that
' See Complaint 74, Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc. v. Does, 584
F. Supp. 2d 824 (W.D.N.C. 2008) (No. 3:08-cv-44) ("[Tihe only effective means of
protecting [NASCAR's] trademarks and service marks from unlawful counterfeiting
by Defendants at NASCAR races is through the ex parte seizure process, which
provides [NASCAR] with the only tool that has been truly effective in the fight
against unlawful counterfeiting."); see also Baker, supra note 34, at 373 ("[A]
situation exists today in which trademark owners and courts, in what is surely a just
desire to protect valuable trademarks, have overstepped the authority given to them
by Congress.").
136 15 U.S.C.A. § 1117 (West 2009).
137 Id. § 1116 (West 2009).
'a See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
"3 See discussion supra Section II.
14o See supra note 135.
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something has happened in the application of the Trademark
Counterfeiting Act, something Congress did not intend and did
not plan for.
As seen above, the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or
Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions, which provide a
template process for carrying out federal in rem statutes, have
several hallmark safeguards of the property owner's
constitutional rights: a verified complaint with particularized
descriptions of the property and its location, a probable cause
standard, assurances that the seizure will take place in the
presence of law enforcement, rules of bounded location for the
seizure unless otherwise provided by statute, and the means by
which property owners will be notified of the seizure."'
Remarkably, or perhaps tellingly, the Trademark Counterfeiting
Act provides many of the very same safeguards, often in
strikingly similar language. First, the Act requires that an
applicant for a seizure order file "an affidavit or the verified
complaint,"' demonstrating facts showing that "the applicant is
likely to succeed in showing that the person against whom
seizure would be ordered used a counterfeit mark .. ."143 This
"likely to succeed" standard is sufficient to meet the probable
cause standard required by all Fourth Amendment seizures.'44
The Act then requires the court, in granting the seizure order, to
provide "a particular description of the matter to be seized, and a
description of each place at which such matter is to be seized."'45
In addition, the Act deals with the usual geographic limitations
placed upon seizure orders, specifically expanding personal
jurisdiction over defendants to "anywhere in the United States
where [the defendant] may be found."'46 Finally, the Act provides
141 See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
142 15 U.S.C.A. § 1116(d)(3)(A).
143 Id. § 1116(d)(4)(B)(iii).
144 See supra note 52.
145 § 1116(d)(5)(B). This addition that the items and their locations be
particularly identified was "[b]eyond the usual equitable rules" that governed
injunctions and seizures for trademark violations before the Trademark
Counterfeiting Act's passage. See 2 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES § 6.4(5)
(2d ed. 1993). The addition was probably mandated by the fact that a seizure must
comport with the Fourth Amendment, which requires that the thing to be seized be
described with particularity. See infra notes 241-246 and accompanying text.
146 § 1116(a); see also Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc. v. Does, 584 F.
Supp. 2d 824, 827 n.5 (W.D.N.C. 2008) ("The Court notes that it has personal
jurisdiction over these Defendants, and others who may be named, because the Act
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that service of the order and seizure thereto be carried out by "a
Federal law enforcement officer ... [or] a State or local law
enforcement officer."1 47 Unlike the Supplemental Rules, however,
the Trademark Counterfeiting Act provides no mechanism for
providing notice to nonparties who might claim an interest in the
seized goods, which is an essential due process component of an
in rem action. 148
Are these overlaps in process between Rule G of the
Supplemental Rules and the Trademark Counterfeiting Act
merely coincidental? Interestingly, the Senate Judiciary
Committee, upon listing the Trademark Counterfeiting Act's
safeguards, stated its belief "that these safeguards are fully
adequate to satisfy the constitutional requirements of due
process, in light of the extraordinary bad faith exhibited by many
commercial counterfeiters, and the need for effective means of
stemming the current epidemic of counterfeiting. " 149  We learn
two important things from this statement: First, Congress was
aware of the constitutional implications of seizing property
pursuant to an ex parte order. Second, and perhaps more
importantly, we learn that Congress, aware of the potential
constitutional pitfalls, considered the interests of trademark
owners and the evils of counterfeiting to be sufficient to override
those pitfalls. However, it is important to remember that
Congress made this determination of adequate constitutional
safeguards with only the shield against spoliation in mind, not
the substantive sword that the seizure and destruction orders
would become. Furthermore, our Constitution mandates due
process to the guilty and innocent alike; 50 it is the province of the
courts, not Congress, to determine if adequate assurances of due
process have been provided.'15
provides for service 'anywhere in the United States where [Defendants] may be
found.' ") (quoting § 1116(a)).
147 § 1116(d)(9).
148 See infra notes 181-182 and accompanying text.
149 S. REP. No. 98-526, at 8 (1984).
"5 See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 62 (1993)
("Fair procedures are not confined to the innocent.").
151 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 524-36 (1997).
The power to interpret the Constitution in a case or controversy remains in
the Judiciary.
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In addition to the similarities between the statutory
language in the Trademark Counterfeiting Act and the
Supplemental Rules, there is also some interesting language in
the legislative history concerning the nature of the counterfeit
marks and their destruction. As seen above, § 1118 provides that
the goods bearing the counterfeit marks may be destroyed after a
violation of the Lanham Act has been established.152 The Senate
Judiciary Committee was more specific than this in its
commentary, stating that the court may order the goods
destroyed "or order that any spurious marks be removed from the
goods or materials and that the goods or materials be given to the
United States or to an appropriate charity." 153 This additional
remark in the legislative history indicating that the goods may be
somewhat redeemed by removing the counterfeit mark, at least
enough to donate to charity, implies a certain malevolence in the
counterfeit mark itself.' In other words, this statement implies
that the court is acting against the thing-the counterfeit
mark155-not the person, and that after the mark's removal the
goods are cured, at least partially, of their counterfeit taint.156
Action against the thing is, of course, the hallmark of an in rem
action.
When Congress acts within its sphere of power and responsibilities, it has
not just the right but the duty to make its own informed judgment on the
meaning and force of the Constitution.
• Congress' discretion is not unlimited, however, and the courts retain
the power, as they have since Marbury v. Madison, to determine if
Congress has exceeded its authority under the Constitution.
Id.
152 See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
1-3 S. REP. No. 98-526, at 19 (emphasis added).
154 Cf Von Hofe v. United States, 492 F.3d 175, 184 (2d Cir. 2007) ("The law
'ascrib[es] to the property a certain personality, a power of complicity and guilt in
the wrong.'") (quoting J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505,
510 (1921)); One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699 (1965).
155 Cf. United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 289 (1996) ("Congress specifically
structured these [in rem customs] forfeitures to be impersonal by targeting the
property itself.").
"1 It must be stressed that this "cure" is only partial, as even property thus
cured may not be returned to the trademark infringing defendant. At the conclusion
of a successful case, the only options for the court are to order the property
destroyed, turned over to the United States Attorney for use in a prosecution, or
perhaps donated for eleemosynary purposes. This suggests that a true forfeiture has
been adjudicated-that private parties have lost their interest in the property-
either as a punitive consequence of their unlawful conduct or because the goods
themselves were contraband. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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A similar idea appears in Congress's Joint Statement on the
Trademark Counterfeiting Act, which compares the destruction
of goods under § 1118 to a very similar authority under one of the
Trademark Counterfeiting Act's updated criminal provisions,
former 18 U.S.C. § 2320(b). 5 7  According to the legislative
history:
This provision [§ 2320(b)] gives the court the same options it
has in ordering destructions under 15 U.S.C. 1118. In practice,
the courts have often ordered that counterfeit articles be given
to charitable institutions or to the Federal Government. If
goods are of value, and pose no threat to health or safety, they
should be preserved whenever possible, so long as any
counterfeit marks are removed. 58
This statement makes it clear that Congress thought of these two
sections as giving courts "the same options."
Former section 2320(b)'s destruction provision operated upon
a finding "by a preponderance of the evidence that any articles in
the possession of a defendant... bear counterfeit marks."' In
contrast to the sparse language of § 1118, this statute bears
many indicia of a modern in rem forfeiture. Most significant is
the fact that property may be destroyed if the court only finds by
a preponderance of the evidence that it bears a counterfeit mark,
whereas a criminal defendant may be acquitted if each element
of the offense (including actual knowledge of its counterfeit
nature) is not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 16 0 Congress
157 See 130 CONG. REC. H12076, H12077 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1984) (joint
statement on Trademark Counterfeiting Act), reprinted in J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 7
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION app. A8, at 20 (4th ed. West
2009). Until amended in 2006, 18 U.S.C. § 2320(b) read: "Upon a determination by a
preponderance of the evidence that any articles in the possession of a defendant in a
prosecution under this section bear counterfeit marks, the United States may obtain
an order for the destruction of such articles." 18 U.S.C. § 2320(b) (2006) (amended
2006 & 2008).
158 130 CONG. REC. H12076, H12077 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1984) (joint statement on
Trademark Counterfeiting Act), reprinted in J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 7 MCCARTHY
ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION app. A8, at 20 (4th ed. West 2009).
1 18 U.S.C. § 2320(b) (amended 2006 & 2008).
160 See United States v. Hanafy, 302 F.3d 485, 487 (5th Cir. 2002).
In order to prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a), the government must
establish that: (1) the defendant trafficked or attempted to traffic in goods
or services; (2) such trafficking, or the attempt to traffic, was intentional;
(3) the defendant used a counterfeit mark on or in connection with such
goods or services; and (4) the defendant knew that the mark so used was
counterfeit.
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recognized as much in its Joint Statement on the Trademark
Counterfeiting Act, stating, "Even if the defendant is ultimately
acquitted of the criminal charge, there is no valid public policy
reason to allow the defendant to retain materials that are in fact
counterfeit."16' This view is consistent with the current state of
forfeiture law: As a peculiar consequence of the in personam /in
rem dichotomy and the differing burdens of proof between civil
and criminal prosecutions, counterfeit property may be forfeited
in a civil in rem proceeding whether or not criminal charges are
actually brought and even if the counterfeiter has been acquitted
of the criminal charges.'62
Section 2320(b) has recently been repealed and replaced by
18 U.S.C.A. § 2323, which now explicitly provides the
government with forfeiture remedies (both civil and criminal) for
violations of the trademark laws. 6 3 The civil forfeiture section
provides that goods bearing counterfeit marks are "subject to
forfeiture to the United States Government" 164 and utilizes the
procedures outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 981 and subsequent sections
pertaining to civil (in rem) forfeitures.'65 The criminal forfeiture
section provides that any property that is otherwise forfeitable in
rem may alternatively be forfeited in personam, as a component
of the defendant's sentence, in accordance with the procedures
set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 853.166 Thus, any ambiguity in Congress's
intent from the enactment of § 1118 and former § 2320(b) as part
of the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984 appears to have
been resolved, at least on the criminal side, in favor of an explicit
forfeiture provision with the enactment of § 2323 as part of the
Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property
Act of 2008.167
161 130 CONG. REC. H12076, H12077 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1984) (joint statement on
Trademark Counterfeiting Act), reprinted in J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 7 MCCARTHY
ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION app. A8, at 20 (4th ed. West 2009).
162 See WILLIAMS & WHITNEY, supra note 8, § 13.5.1; SMITH, supra note 67,
§ 1.03.
16 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2323(a)-(b) (West 2009); Prioritizing Resources and
Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-403, §§ 205(b),
206, 122 Stat. 4256, 4261-63 (2008).
16 § 2323(a)(1).
165 § 2323(a)(2); see supra note 104.
16 See § 2323(b)(1)-(2); 21 U.S.C.A. § 853 (West 2009).
167 See 15 U.S.C. § 1118 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 2320(b) (1984), amended by
Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008
§§ 205(b), 206; H.R. REP. No. 110-617, at 20 (2008) (stating that the purpose of the
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These changes imply that Congress understands that
products bearing counterfeit marks pose a threat to commerce
thus requiring a remedy entirely independent of the need to
punish counterfeiters for their misdoings. Just because a
defendant is acquitted of criminal charges does not mean that he
should be permitted to retain possession of counterfeit goods.
Similarly, just because a trademark owner can receive no
meaningful monetary recovery from a guilty party does not mean
that counterfeit wares should continue to infect the marketplace.
Indeed, there are many reasons why a private civil seizure
and forfeiture process may make good public policy. Just as early
forfeitures achieved many governmental objectives that the penal
laws alone could not accomplish, 168 the forfeiture of counterfeit
goods achieves all the basic purposes of the Lanham Act and
substitutes for the absence of other remedies where no culpable
individual is "brought to justice." The broader purpose of the
Lanham Act, as expressed in its legislative history, is "the
protection of trademarks, securing to the owner the good will of
his business and protecting the public against spurious and
falsely marked goods." 69 Where counterfeiters are peddling
falsely marked goods, the seizure of the counterfeit goods has the
effect of immediately stopping this unfair competition. As a
consequence, consumers are denied access to illegitimate (and
perhaps inferior) sources for the desired product, counterfeiters
are denied the profits they could otherwise obtain by free riding
on trademark owners' goodwill, and trademark owners are able
to capture the economic rents to which they are entitled to based
on their right of exclusive use of the mark.
There is, finally, the practical application of seizure orders
versus their original congressional mandate. Either Congress
misunderstood the nature of most counterfeiting actions or the
practice has simply evolved to the point of making Congress's
conception of counterfeiting anachronistic. For example, a key
provision of § 1116(d) is that the ex parte seizure order be filed
under seal so as to protect the reputation of the alleged
Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008 is to
"strengthen civil and criminal intellectual property laws" by "harmonizing forfeiture
procedures for intellectual property offenses").
' See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
169 In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1360 (C.C.P.A. 1973)
(quoting S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3 (1946)).
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counterfeiter. 170  In addition, the legislative history is replete
with references to alleged counterfeiters' appearances in court
and their potential arguments therein.'17  In practice, however,
there are relatively few reported cases in which actual
defendants appear in court to defend themselves. The majority
of these few cases appeared in the 1970s and 1980s, either before
Congress passed the Trademark Counterfeiting Act or very soon
thereafter. 72  In current practice, a trademark owner almost
never meets opposition in court, 73  as the majority of
counterfeiters are "street vendors who peddle their goods at flea
markets, city kiosks, and live entertainment events... [and that
170 15 U.S.C.A. § 1116(d)(8) (West 2009).
171 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 98-526, at 7 (1984) ("[Alt the TRO hearing you will learn
that the defendant had no goods or documents at the time the notice was given and,
in fact, the only such goods he or she ever sold [were] the ones that your investigator
bought.").
172 See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Gibson Chem. & Oil Corp., 786 F.2d 105, 107-
08 (2d Cir. 1986); In re Vuitton et Fils S.A., 606 F.2d 1, 1, 2 n.2 (2d Cir. 1979);
Swatch Watch, S.A. v. Aste Trading Corp., No. 85 Civ. 7726, 1986 WL 734, at *1-2
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 1986).
173 See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc. v. Does, 584 F. Supp. 2d
824, 828 (W.D.N.C. 2008) ("It appears unlikely that any Defendant will ever appear
to contest Plaintiffs' motions and the Court's orders in this case."); SKS Merch, LLC.
v. Barry, 233 F. Supp. 2d 841, 847-48 (E.D. Ky. 2002) ("[Tlhe Defendants' nomadic
nature and refusal to identify themselves would make any collection of damages by
the Plaintiffs exceedingly improbable."); Polo Ralph Lauren, L.P. v. 3M Trading Co.,
No. 97 Civ. 4824, 1999 WL 33740332, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 1999) ("[Dlefendants
have declined to participate in this lawsuit, and have thus deprived plaintiffs of the
opportunity to make a meaningful assessment of the extent of their business,
including volume of sales and profits earned."); Time Warner Entm't Co., L.P. v.
Does, 876 F. Supp. 407, 409 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) ("The names and, indeed, the existence
of defendants John Does 1 through 10 are unknown to plaintiffs and the Court at
this time."); see also Memorandum in Support of Motion for Entry of Default
Judgment for Forfeiture of Seized Counterfeit Goods and for Voluntary Dismissal
Without Prejudice as to All Other Claims at 2-3, Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto
Racing, Inc, v. Does, 584 F. Supp. 2d 824 (W.D.N.C. 2008) (No. 3:08-cv-44) ("None of
the named Defendants who was personally served in this action has answered or
otherwise appeared, and no party has filed any claim to any of the Goods or any
objection to the forfeiture and destruction or other disposal of the same.").
The authors do not go so far as to say that opposition in court never occurs, see, e.g.,
Beltronics USA, Inc. v. Midwest Inventory Distrib. LLC, 545 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1189
(D. Kan. 2008), but only posit what appears to be a reasonable conclusion from the
available case law and expert literature: Modern counterfeiting cases, more often
than not, proceed without opposition.
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operate] on the fringe of society."'74 These "itinerant vendors are
nomadic by nature and are highly unlikely to challenge
[a] ... seizure order in court."' 75
The business model under which these fringe-element
counterfeiters operate poses a serious obstacle to trademark
owners obtaining the in personam remedies that form the crux of
the Trademark Counterfeiting Act. Unlicensed street peddlers
working a weekend sports or entertainment venue are unlikely to
have resources sufficient to justify an action for monetary
damages. Moreover, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the
vendors from whom the counterfeit goods are seized are not even
the true owners of the goods they sell or the masterminds behind
the counterfeiting scheme. Perhaps more likely is a scenario in
which they are mere agents or bailees, peddling the goods on
behalf of a much larger manufacturer. The proprietors of these
larger-scale counterfeiting operations might have sufficiently
deep pockets to justify a traditional in personam suit, but their
identities may not be known to or discoverable by the trademark
owner, or they otherwise may not be amenable to service of
process. In this scenario, the seizure and forfeiture of the
counterfeit goods is the only meaningful remedy available to the
trademark owner. Seizure and forfeiture is effective against both
the immediate retailer and anyone up the chain of the counterfeit
operation because it denies them the ultimate economic benefit of
their crimes. However, it is the very possibility (indeed,
probability) that the seizure and forfeiture of counterfeit goods
affects the property rights of persons who are not named
defendants and unknown to the court that raises serious due
process concerns with the use of § 1116(d) and §1118 as a
substantive remedy, as shall be seen in the following Section.
Reflecting the reality of the trademark owner's predicament
under the Trademark Counterfeiting Act, NASCAR has neither
sought nor received a single dollar from the defendants in its
actions, stating that it "has no practical need to pursue remedies
(other than forfeiture of the Goods) against any of the named
defendants.' 76 And yet, under the theory of the seizure order
174 Paglia & Rush, supra note 33, at 5.
175 Baker, supra note 34, at 372.
171 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Entry of Default Judgment for
Forfeiture of Seized Counterfeit Goods and for Voluntary Dismissal Without
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qua evidentiary tool, the ultimate remedy should be treble
damages. In actuality, this rarely, if ever, occurs. Faced with a
situation that was considered dire two decades ago, and by all
accounts has only gotten worse,177 trademark owners have taken
their only effective tool and turned it into something it was never
meant to be: An in rem process whereby property is seized,
condemned for its counterfeit nature, and either destroyed or
partially cured. This evolution of the seizure order has,
ironically, made the counterfeiters themselves-and the potential
damages against them-utterly irrelevant.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF AN INREM PROCESS FOR TRADEMARK
OWNERS AND THE COURTS
The differences between in rem and in personam procedures
have baffled attorneys for quite some time17' and will no doubt
continue to do so into the foreseeable future. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has on at least one occasion expressed the
opinion that constitutional questions, such as due process, can be
answered without resolving the in rem/in personam issue.'79
Prejudice as to All Other Claims at 6, Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc, v.
Does, 584 F. Supp. 2d 824 (W.D.N.C. 2008) (No. 3:08-cv-44).
177 See Heather J. McDonald, What Every Litigator Must Know About
Intellectual Property 2004, in 798 PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND
LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 593, 597 (Practitising Law Ins. ed.,
2004) ("The size and scope of counterfeiting has dramatically increased over the past
decade. The economy of this country, as well as those of companies around the world,
are suffering huge losses in the form of tax revenue and unemployment due to the
manufacture and sale of counterfeit products."); see also Levin, supra note 133, at
171 ("It is clear that the problem presented by trademark counterfeiting has
significantly worsened since the ex parte seizure remedy was introduced in
1984 .... The problem of trademark counterfeiting has reached epic proportions.").
178 See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312 (1950)
("Distinctions between actions in rem and those in personam are ancient and
originally expressed in procedural terms what seems really to have been a
distinction in the substantive law of property under a system quite unlike our
own.").
179 See id. ("[T]he present proceeding... has some characteristics and is wanting
in some features of proceedings both in rem and in personam. But in any event we
think that the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution do not depend upon a classification for which the standards are so
elusive and confused.... "). There are other contexts, however, in which the
Supreme Court has explicitly held that an in rem forfeiture provides constitutional
safeguards that an in personam action does not. See Austin v. United States, 509
U.S. 602, 622 (1993) ("We ... conclude that [a civil in rem] forfeiture under these
provisions [21 U.S.C. § 881] constitutes 'payment to a sovereign as punishment for
some offense,' and, as such, is subject to the limitations of the Eighth Amendment's
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This seeming dismissal of the often confusing dichotomy,
however, is not a rejection of the constitutional interests
implicated when property is involved, but rather recognition of
the practical reality that the same interests are implicated
regardless of the label given to an action. Applying this principle
to the Trademark Counterfeiting Act, the issue is not
conclusively resolved simply by calling the action in personam or
in rem but in discovering whose interests are implicated in the
action and how a court can assure itself that all interested
parties are adequately protected under the Constitution.
Accordingly, this Section will discuss two constitutional
principles-the Due Process Clause and the Fourth
Amendment-to determine whether all the appropriate interests
are being protected under the Trademark Counterfeiting Act as it
is applied today.
A. Due Process
As stated above, the United States Supreme Court has made
it clear that due process rights "cannot depend on the
classification of an action as in rem or in personam, since that is
'a classification for which the standards are so elusive and
confused generally and which, being primarily for state courts to
define, may and do vary from state to state.' ,,180 In practically
the same breath, however, the Court stated that "property cannot
be subjected to a court's judgment unless reasonable and
appropriate efforts have been made to give the property owners
actual notice of the action."' Thus, regardless of the label given
to an action involving seizure and forfeiture, it seems clear that
the Due Process Clause requires "notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard" to those who have a cognizable interest
in the seized and soon to be forfeited property. 8 2
The question, then, returns to the nature of a seizure and
destruction action under the Trademark Counterfeiting Act.
Three options present themselves. First, the Act could be
Excessive Fines Clause.") (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 265 (1989)). But see United States v. One 1997 Ford
Expedition Util. Vehicle, 135 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1145 (D.N.M. 2001) ("[Tlhe fact that
this proceeding is in rem is not dispositive of the [Eighth Amendment] issue.").
ISO Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 206 (1977) (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at
312).
181 Id.
182 United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 62 (1993).
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construed as it appears Congress originally intended it-solely in
personam, with the seizure process as a discovery tool and the
destruction of goods as a method of evidentiary housekeeping at
the close of the case. In these circumstances, due process would
be satisfied when the named defendants are personally served at
the time of the seizure and then given the opportunity to be
heard. If they never appear to contest the seizure or the
plaintiffs claims of trademark infringement, it could reasonably
be inferred that the property has been abandoned, in which case
the court could dispose of it without offending anyone's due
process rights. The presumption of abandonment weakens,
however, the more likely it is that there exist third parties with
interests in the property who have never been given actual notice
of the seizure or of the pendency of the lawsuit.18 3 Furthermore,
as trademark litigation evolves such that the property seizure
process begins to look more like a substantive remedy in the
nature of an in rem action, culminating in a judgment respecting
the property that is binding on all the world, it becomes all the
more doubtful that standard in personam methods for providing
notice are constitutionally sufficient. When in doubt, it behooves
both courts desirous of a clean trial record and trademark
plaintiffs who may be subject to personal liability for wrongful
seizures 84 to ensure that defendants receive more rather than
less due process.
Assuming, therefore, that trademark litigation has entered a
new paradigm in which the case concludes with a forfeiture
comprising part or all of the remedy, two other options come to
the fore: The Act could be construed as providing for either an in
personam forfeiture akin to the criminal forfeiture now found in
1a Trademark owners may at this point argue that there is no "innocent owner"
defense provided for in the Trademark Counterfeiting Act and that due process to
third parties is, therefore, irrelevant. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 983(d) (2006). However,
framing the debate in this fashion ignores two important issues. First, Congress may
not have provided for an innocent owner defense in the Trademark Counterfeiting
Act because it did not conceive of the seizure as it was created as an in rem action.
Given the evolution of the Act and its seizure power, Congress might be more
inclined to provide a defense for innocent owners should it revise the Act to explicitly
include an in rem cause of action. Second, there are other avenues innocent owners
could pursue, such as interpleader to defend against the underlying counterfeiting
action, if provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard.
184 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1116(d)(11) (West 2009) ("A person who suffers damage by
reason of a wrongful seizure under this subsection has a cause of action against the
applicant for the order under which such seizure was made .. ").
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18 U.S.C. § 2323(b) or an in rem forfeiture akin to the civil
forfeiture provision now found in 18 U.S.C. § 2323(a).' 8 1 It is
tempting to favor the in personam forfeiture reading, as that
represents the smallest departure from the glaringly in personam
gloss that the text and legislative history gives the surrounding
statute. But recalling the words of Justice Story, that "[mlany
cases exist, where there is both a forfeiture in rem and a personal
penalty,"18 6 there is nothing particularly problematic with
reading an in rem remedy into an otherwise in personam
statutory scheme. Furthermore, there are a number of reasons
that favor an in rem reading, not the least of which is the fact
that an in personam forfeiture is, as the name suggests, an in
personam judgment that binds only the named defendants and
"does not resolve whatever claims third parties may have to the
property."18 7  This is a serious limitation on in personam
forfeitures since it does not provide prevailing plaintiffs with
much security that good title to the property has been passed so
that the property may then be safely disposed of. This problem is
not a new one-the original criminal forfeitures enacted by
Congress provided no procedure for third-party notice or the
adjudication of third-party claims-yet many felt that due
process compelled the judicial resolution of potential third-party
claims before entering a final order of forfeiture.188  In response,
Congress amended the criminal forfeiture statutes in 198489 to
provide for an ancillary claims process in criminal forfeiture
cases that imposes essentially the same notice and opportunity
for hearing requirements as those required in civil in rem
forfeitures. 90 It is reasonable to infer that courts would adopt a
11 For a discussion of the differences between in personam and in rem
forfeitures, see supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
11 The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14 (1827).
187 SMITH, supra note 67, § 2.03.
"' See id. § 14.08[2] [b]; see also Schwartz v. United States, 582 F. Supp. 224,
226 (D. Md. 1984).
189 See Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 301-323,
98 Stat. 1837, 2040-41 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C § 1963, 21 U.S.C. § 853,
and 28 U.S.C. § 524).
190 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(n)(1) (West 2009).
Following the entry of an order of forfeiture under this section, the United
States shall publish notice of the order and of its intent to dispose of the
property in such manner as the Attorney General may direct. The
Government may also, to the extent practicable, provide direct written
notice to any person known to have alleged an interest in the property that
is the subject of the order of forfeiture ....
[Vol. 83:735
2009] WHO CARES ABOUT THE COUNTERFEITERS? 771
similar process even if 15 U.S.C. § 1118 were construed as
creating an in personam forfeiture, especially in light of the
Supreme Court's holding that due process rights "cannot depend
on the classification of an action as in rem or in personam."191
NASCAR and its associates are just starting to deal with the
thorny issue of in personam versus in rem jurisdiction and the
implications for due process, albeit involuntarily. In National
Association for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc. v. Does ("NASCAR v.
Does"), the court initially granted NASCAR's request for an ex
parte seizure order and temporary restraining order ("TRO") and
then, after the first seizure, extended the seizure order along
with a preliminary injunction that would last the entirety of
NASCAR's 2008 racing season. 192  Near the conclusion of the
season, the court, sua sponte, addressed the issue of the seizure
order as being in the nature of an in rem proceeding and the
implications for constitutional due process. Specifically, the
court raised two issues with the way NASCAR had previously
handled litigation against counterfeiters: (1) may a plaintiff in a
counterfeiting case obtain a seizure order, seize goods for nearly
a year, and then destroy those goods without obtaining a final
judgment against the named defendants; 193 and (2) what kind of
notice must NASCAR provide to potential owners of the seized
property who have not been personally served in the action? 94
The second inquiry would have been irrelevant in an entirely in
Id.
191 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 206 (1977).
192 See Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc. v. Does, 584 F. Supp. 2d 824,
826-27 (W.D.N.C. 2008). The court later questioned its decision, stating:
The Court continues to have some concerns about the propriety of its
Preliminary Injunction and Seizure Order. The Act clearly provides that
any seizure order granted "shall end not later than seven days after the
date on which such order is issued, during which the seizure is to be made."
15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(5)(C) [(2006)]. Despite this strict time limitation,
Plaintiffs urged the Court to extend the seizure order into a preliminary
injunction effective through the end of the racing season. Because of
Plaintiffs' previous history in this district, including seizure orders lasting
far more than seven days, and because of the nature of irreparable harm
alleged, the Court extended the seizure order despite its misgivings. That
seizure order has now been in effect for over seven months. It remains
unclear to the Court whether Congress intended for seizures under the Act
to continue for so long, when the seven-day statutory limitation does not
appear to allow for exception.
Id. at 827 n.6.
1'3 See id. at 828-29.
194 See id. at 828-31.
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personam action, but an in rem action binds the whole world, not
just those that have been personally served with process.'95
Thus, before making the inquiry, the court stated its opinion that
"[t]he seizure of counterfeit goods under section 1116(d) and their
destruction under section 1118 contemplates judicial action
taken directly against the offending property-relief in the
nature of an in rem forfeiture."196
First, the court stated its perception that "the ultimate
remedy sought by [NASCAR] does not appear to be Congress's
reason for passing the Counterfeiting and Trademark Act of
1984," namely the preservation of evidence. 97 The court then
noted NASCAR's habit of bringing counterfeit actions, seizing
property pursuant to seizure orders that last nearly a year, and
then voluntarily dismissing the action. 98 Apparently, NASCAR
would voluntarily dismiss each case after seizing counterfeit
goods throughout the season and then dispose of those goods.
However, NASCAR never sought a final judgment definitively
establishing the named defendants as counterfeiters or the seized
goods as counterfeit. 99
The trouble with destroying allegedly counterfeit property
following a voluntary dismissal is twofold: (1) voluntary dismissal
deprives the court of jurisdiction over the res; and (2) such action
contravenes the statutory requirement that a "violation" first
"shall have been established." Thus, the property is condemned
without any judicial finding of fault, either in rem or in
personam.20 0 The first issue was not explicitly addressed by the
district court in NASCAR, and the issue has only been considered
at length by a single published appellate decision.20 In In re
Matthews, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit considered the appeal of a person claiming an interest in
one of the original copies of the Bill of Rights that had been taken
195 WILLIAMS & WHITNEY, supra note 8, § 13.6, at 722.
16 NASCAR, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 829.
197 Id. at 828.
198 See id. at 828-29.
'9 See id. NASCAR had made a showing that it was "likely to succeed in
showing that the person against whom seizure would be ordered used a counterfeit
mark," 15 U.S.C.A. § 1116(d)(4)(B)(iii) (West 2009), a prerequisite showing for any
§ 1116(d) seizure order, but had never established by the preponderance of the
evidence, either before the court or a jury, that the goods were counterfeit.
200 15 U.S.C. § 1118 (2006).
201 See In re Matthews, 395 F.3d 477 (4th Cir. 2005).
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from the State of North Carolina during the Civil War.202  The
United States seized the document and began civil forfeiture
proceedings but later voluntarily dismissed the action after the
party from whom it was seized agreed to convey the document
back to the State.2 °3 Despite the existence of a third party who
claimed to be a co-owner of the document, the district court
entered an in rem judgment, ruling that North Carolina was the
lawful owner. 20 4 Reversing, the Fourth Circuit held:
Once the United States voluntarily dismissed its forfeiture
action, all proceedings in the action were terminated, and the
district court lacked the authority to issue further orders
addressing the merits of the case. In particular, although the
[various claimants] continued to assert ownership interests in
the document, the district court no longer had authority to
adjudicate those interests-as it would have done had the
forfeiture action gone forward ....
The court of appeals then remanded the case to the district court
with instructions to return possession of the Bill of Rights so as
to restore the parties to the status quo ante. °6
In this same vein, the text of 15 U.S.C § 1118 does not
permit the destruction of property prior to a final adjudication on
the merits: A Lanham Act violation must first be "established."2 °7
If § 1118 is read as effecting an in personam forfeiture, with the
forfeiture being part of the penalty against a named defendant
following the successful prosecution of a Lanham Act claim, then
it follows that a final judgment against the named defendants
(either by default or trial) is a prerequisite to a § 1118
destruction order.2 °5 On the other hand, if § 1118 is read in
202 See id. at 478-80.
203 See id. at 479.
204 See id. at 479-80.
205 Id. at 482.
201 See id. at 483-84.
207 15 U.S.C. § 1118 (2006).
206 See Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc. v. Does, 584 F. Supp. 2d 824,
829 ("[The text of 15 U.S.C. § 1118 dictates that a final judgment against the in
personam defendants is a necessary precondition to the ultimate forfeiture and
destruction of the seized merchandise.... ."). Interestingly, a final judgment is
expressly required for the destruction of infringing articles in copyright litigation.
See also 17 U.S.C.A. § 503(b) (West 2009); TERENCE P. Ross, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW: DAMAGES AND REMEDIES § 13.07 (16th ed. 2009) ("In copyright
infringement litigation, the copyright owner may only obtain [a destruction] order as
part of its post-trial relief."). One could argue that Congress, when it wrote the
Trademark Infringement Act without such an explicit requirement, did not intend to
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harmony with former 18 U.S.C. § 2320(b) as an in rem forfeiture
authority entirely independent of the in personam claims,
requiring only that the property itself be "established" as
counterfeit (the counterfeit nature of the goods being just one
element of an in personam Lanham Act claim), the plaintiff still
must prove, and the court must find, that the property is "guilty"
of being counterfeit.2" 9 Thus, as the NASCAR court observed,
voluntary dismissal prior to final judgment is not a viable option,
as the trademark plaintiff would have to restore the status quo
ante by returning the property to those from whom it was
seized.210 Ultimately, however, the court permitted NASCAR to
voluntarily dismiss the in personam claims against the named
defendants without prejudice and entered a default judgment in
rem only against the counterfeit goods,211 thus allowing NASCAR
to preserve its in personam claims for a day in which they might
prove to be more profitable.
While proceeding through to judgment is a necessary
precondition to the destruction of goods under § 1118,
the NASCAR court held that "this alone is not sufficient. 212
Due process requires that reasonable efforts be made to provide
notice and an opportunity to be heard to all potentially
interested parties. This leads us to our second inquiry: What
due process requirements must be met for in rem actions?
equate "established" with a final judgment on the merits. It is, however, difficult to
see what other procedural milestone would sufficiently establish an item's
counterfeit nature such that a court could order that item's destruction with
complete confidence.
209 See NASCAR, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 829 (stating that plaintiffs must
demonstrate a violation of the Lanham Act in order to possess statutory authority to
dispose of goods under § 1118).
210 [I]t appears certain that Plaintiffs will again voluntarily dismiss this
case before obtaining a final judgment .... Under this course of action,
however, all seized property, never having been finally adjudicated to be
counterfeit, must be returned to Defendants. The Court understands the
near impossibility of this task given Defendants' transient nature, as well
as the inequity of returning likely counterfeit property to the suspected
counterfeiters. Nevertheless, that would be Plaintiffs' burden, never having
shown more than a likelihood of success in this action.
Id.
211 Order and Default Judgment at 2, Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc.
v. Does, (W.D.N.C. 2008) (No. 3:08-cv-44).
212 NASCAR, 584 F. Supp. at 829.
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In NASCAR, the court began with the observation that the
seizure and destruction of counterfeit marks was "judicial action
taken directly against the offending property-relief in the
nature of an in rem forfeiture."213 In making this determination,
the court relied partly upon a statement in Dobbs's Law of
Remedies that reads, "As a matter of remedial form, the [§ 1116]
seizure is not an injunction but an in rem action, in which the
marshall [sic] actually seizes the goods and materials identified
in the order."214 The court then provided a brief discussion of in
rem actions, stating that in such actions "[d]ue process...
requires that all interested parties, whether known or unknown,
be provided with adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard
before the Court orders final disposition of the property." '215
Counterfeiting actions, however, present a problem. If
counterfeiting street vendors are the characters that
conventional wisdom believes them to be, they hardly have the
capital to start up a business venture, legitimate or otherwise.
Thus, as discussed above, there may be others besides the named
defendants who could claim an interest in the property.
In one scenario, there may be a behind-the-scenes owner who
is entirely aware of the counterfeit activity and is taking either
an active or tacit role therein. Such a culpable participant would
have a weak claim for a due process violation when his goods are
seized and destroyed. If the street vendors are his agents, then it
is likely that he will have received actual notice of the seizure
and any notice served on his agents at the time of the seizure.2 16
Furthermore, as a practical matter, a guilty coconspirator is
unlikely to appear to contest the seizure since he would have
nothing to gain (the goods would still be subject to forfeiture) and
everything to lose by revealing his identity and exposing himself
to liability. However, what if the owner is not possessed of such
a guilty mind, but instead is an innocent consignor of goods that
have been altered without his knowledge to bear counterfeit
213 Id.
214 2 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 6.4(5) (2d ed. 1993).
215 NASCAR, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 829-30.
216 This cursory analysis of the guilty consignor is not to say that the due process
argument is foreclosed altogether, just to say that, more likely than not, service
upon his coconspirator along with all the attendant circumstances is likely sufficient
to "apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections." Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
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marks?2 17 Or, what if the goods are in fact not counterfeit at all,
but the vendor from whom they are seized knows no better and
decides it to be in his own best interests to cut and run? In these
scenarios, it is much less likely to expect that the innocent owner
would get actual notice of the seizure from his sales agents; yet it
is obvious that he might want an opportunity to contest the
forfeiture.
Finally, with the enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 2323, it is now
clear that the United States government has a legal interest in
any seized property.218 Although 15 U.S.C. § 1118 has always
required that notice be given to the United States Attorney prior
to the destruction of counterfeit goods, the new 18 U.S.C. § 2323
clarifies one policy reason behind this: Because counterfeit goods
are now explicitly subject to forfeiture, title to the property vests
in the United States at the time of the act giving rise to the
forfeiture (for example, the moment the property obtains its
counterfeit nature) under what is known as the "relation back"
doctrine. 19 Therefore, trademark plaintiffs should realize that
when they prosecute one of these Lanham Act forfeitures, they
are in effect standing in the shoes of the United States, and thus
must ensure that the Government is given proper notice
throughout the litigation.22 °
Given the number of third parties who might claim an
interest in the property, adequate notice and an opportunity to be
heard must be provided before a judgment concerning the
property, binding on all the world, can be rendered. For reasons
already discussed, an in personam judgment against the named
217 Equally plausible, he might consign the goods with full knowledge that they
will be altered to bear trademarks but innocently believe that a licensing fee has
been paid for this privilege.
218 See 18 U.S.C.A § 2323(b)(1) (West 2009).
219 See id. § 2323(a)(2). Section 2323(a)(2) incorporates the procedure found in
18 U.S.C. § 981(f) under which "[aill right, title, and interest in property [that is
subject to forfeiture] shall vest in the United States upon commission of the act
giving rise to forfeiture under this section." 18 U.S.C.A. § 981(f) (West 2009). See
generally WILLIAMS & WHITNEY, supra note 8, § 12.5.2.2, at 546-55 (discussing the
relation back doctrine).
220 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1116(d)(2) (West 2009) ("The court shall not receive an
application under this subsection unless the applicant has given such notice of the
application as is reasonable under the circumstances to the United States attorney
for the judicial district in which such order is sought."); 15 U.S.C. § 1118 (2006)
("The party seeking an order under this section for destruction of articles seized
under section 1116(d) of this title shall give ten days' notice to the United States
attorney for the judicial district in which such order is sought. .. ").
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defendants will not suffice. Even if a plaintiff prevails on his in
personam Lanham Act claims, thus establishing the counterfeit
nature of the goods as an element of those claims, collateral
estoppel does not extend to third parties. This finding, therefore,
does not bind the entire world.22' Concerns such as these led the
NASCAR Court to state:
[B]ecause the mere possession of personal property at the time
of its seizure is not conclusive of ownership, persons who are
potentially interested parties yet remain unidentified are
entitled to some additional form of notice and must be provided
an independent opportunity to be heard, since they cannot be
said to forfeit their rights in the property simply by virtue of an
in personam judgment against the named defendants. 222
The problem, according to the court, was that the Trademark
Counterfeiting Act does not state the means for providing notice
to these potentially interested parties.223 Section 1116 provides a
great deal of prerequisites to the seizure order, and certain
procedures to take place immediately after the seizure has
occurred, but it goes no further.224 The court felt that this "gap in
the statute"225 was easily filled by the Supplemental Rules that
have already been discussed and which, by their terms, apply to
"forfeiture actions in rem arising from a federal statute."226
Conveniently, the Supplemental Rules supply ample procedure
for giving notice to potential claimants who are unknown
through notice by publication. 227  The court detailed the steps
NASCAR must take under the Supplemental Rules, which, when
simplified, amount to publication of a notice of seizure and the
221 Schwartz v. United States, 582 F. Supp. 224, 227 (D. Md. 1984) ("[The
nature of [an in personam forfeiture] judgment simply means that it cannot have a
collateral estoppel or res judicata effect as to future claimants who were not parties
to the original action.").
222 Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc. v. Does, 584 F. Supp. 2d 824, 830
(W.D.N.C. 2008).
223 "Nowhere in the Act is there a discussion of whom to notify or how to
accomplish notice." Id.
22 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1116 (West 2009). This lack of additional procedure may
provide additional ammunition for the argument that Congress did not anticipate
the extended seizure order qua substantive remedy that has evolved from its
original brief seizure order qua procedural tool.
225 NASCAR, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 830.
226 FED. R. Civ. P. SuPP. R. A(1)(B).
2 See Id. G(4)(a); NASCAR, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 830-31.
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proceedings that will culminate in the property's destruction.228
Finding that no traditional medium of publication would reach a
wide enough audience, the court ordered publication to take place
on www.NASCAR.com. 229 Thus, the concerns surrounding the
notice aspect of due process were resolved in a rather simple way.
Finally, discussion of due process would not be complete
without mentioning the "opportunity to be heard" component,
although it is somewhat less paramount considering the recent
trend of Lanham Act forfeitures to proceed uncontested. The
leading case in the area of forfeiture law is Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. ,230 in which the Court reaffirmed prior
holdings "that, in limited circumstances, immediate seizure of a
property interest, without an opportunity for prior hearing, is
constitutionally permissible."231  The Supreme Court relied
heavily on the fact that the type of property seized-in that case,
a yacht-is "of a sort that could be removed to another
jurisdiction, destroyed, or concealed, if advance warning of
confiscation were given."2"2 Seizures under § 1116(d) presuppose
the exact kind of extraordinary circumstances that would
warrant an ex parte seizure order with a defendant's notice and
opportunity for hearing being delayed until after the seizure has
occurred. Indeed, § 1116(d) seems to be modeled off the operative
language of Calero-Toledo, requiring the district judge to find, as
a prerequisite to issuing an ex parte seizure order, that "the
person against whom seizure would be ordered ... would destroy,
move, hide, or otherwise make such matter inaccessible to
the court, if the applicant were to proceed on notice to
such person. "233  Thus, the ex parte seizure process
passes constitutional muster under Calero-Toledo so long as a
meaningful opportunity to be heard is provided without
undue delay after the seizure has been effectuated.
228 See NASCAR, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 830-31; see also FED. R. Civ. P. SUPP. R.
G(4).
229 See NASCAR, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 831. Supplemental Rule G(4)(a)(iv)(C)
similarly permits the Government to post notice "on an official internet government
forfeiture site" in lieu of newspaper publication. FED. R. CIv. P. SUPP. R. G(4)(a).
230 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
231 Id. at 678.
232 Id. at 679.
233 15 U.S.C.A. § 1116(d)(4)(B)(vii) (West 2009).
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Pursuant to the statute, a post-seizure hearing must be held
on a date "set by the court in the order of seizure," such date to
be "not sooner than ten days" nor "later than fifteen days after
the order is issued, unless the applicant for the order shows good
cause for another date."234 That the date of hearing is set forth in
the seizure order, which must be served on the defendant at the
time of seizure, 23 ensures that the defendant has actual notice of
the court exercising jurisdiction and of the time and place to
appear. Similarly, notice by publication under the Supplemental
Rules must "state the times [in which a claimant is] to file a
claim and to answer"2 36 in order to provide adequate notice of
procedural rights to unknown claimants. With respect to the
time frame for holding the post-seizure hearing, the statute
contemplates that the hearing will be held between ten and
fifteen days after the date the order is issued-further indication
that Congress believed that an ex parte seizure order would
coincide with an ex parte temporary restraining order, which
itself would expire in ten days' time unless an adversarial
hearing (following notice) was held to convert it into a
preliminary injunction.2 37  Section 1116(d)(10)(A) does provide,
however, that a plaintiff may obtain a later hearing date for good
cause shown.238 Where courts have disjoined the seizure order
from the TRO and, as in the case of NASCAR, have allowed
seizure orders to persist for an entire racing season,239 this
provision would seem to allow sufficient flexibility for the court to
set a consolidated post-seizure/forfeiture hearing to be held at the
conclusion of the case.
B. The Fourth Amendment
NASCAR v. Does only addressed due process concerns, as the
court was primarily concerned with the conclusion of the seizure
and destruction process, not its inception. Other courts have
234 Id. § 1116 (d)(10)(A).
235 Id. § 1116 (d)(9).
236 FED. R. Civ. P. SUPP. R. G(4)(a)(ii)(B).
23 § 1116(d)(10)(A); FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)(2)-(3).
2 § 1116(d)(10)(A).
239 See Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc. v. Does, 584 F. Supp. 2d 824,
827 (W.D.N.C. 2008).
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addressed the beginning of the process, questioning whether the
Trademark Counterfeiting Act's seizure order comports with the
Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment applies to a § 1116 seizure order
just as it does in any criminal context.4 0 While it is true that
"[i]n the civil context, the standards of reasonableness are less
stringent than in the criminal context," courts are, nevertheless,
"guided by the principles of probable cause and particularity that
underlie the notion of reasonableness." 241 Thus, the principles of
probable cause and particularity apply here as they would to any
other context. Two Fourth Amendment requirements that are of
paramount importance to seizure orders under the Trademark
Counterfeiting Act are (1) that the thing to be seized be described
with particularity, and (2) that the time for execution of the
seizure not be unconstitutionally delayed-that is, that probable
cause not go stale.
The Fourth Amendment states that no warrants shall issue
except those "particularly describing the... things to be
seized."242 This requirement is thought to have three purposes:
(1) to prevent the "general searches" so abhorred by the
Founders,243 (2) to allow "the officer executing [the warrant to]
240 See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978) ("[Tlhe Fourth
Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches protects against warrantless
intrusions during civil as well as criminal investigations."); Gucci Am., Inc. v.
Accents, 955 F. Supp. 279, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
As a general matter, the fact that a court-ordered seizure (accomplished,
under the [Trademark Counterfeiting] Act, with the assistance of the U.S.
Marshals) arises from the application of a private party in a civil action
does not exempt it from scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment. Indeed,
when a private and interested party solicits judicial authorization for the
kind of search and seizure that is normally reserved to Government agents,
there is an obvious potential for abuse.
Id. (citation omitted).
241 Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Doe, 821 F. Supp. 82, 90 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
Although different from seizures under the Trademark Counterfeiting Act, it should
be noted that the constitutional safeguards in a civil forfeiture action brought by the
government are very different than their application in the criminal context. See
Helen M. Kemp, Presumed Guilty: When the War on Drugs Becomes a War on the
Constitution, 14 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 273, 303 (1994) ("The current civil forfeiture
procedure does not include the constitutional protections that attach to criminal
proceedings.... The Fourth Amendment protection against illegal searches and
seizures has only a limited impact on civil forfeitures.").
242 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
243 See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 195 (1927).
General searches have long been deemed to violate fundamental rights. It
is plain that the amendment forbids them .... "In order to ascertain the
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identify the property sought with reasonable certainty,"2" and
(3) to prevent "the issue of warrants on loose, vague or doubtful
bases of fact."245
Congress provided for the satisfaction of the particularity
requirement in the Trademark Counterfeiting Act by requiring
courts, before granting a seizure order, to state "a particular
description of the matter to be seized."246 Courts are also
required to provide "a description of each place at which such
matter is to be seized."247  In its Joint Statement on the
Trademark Counterfeiting Act, Congress explained the first
requirement, stating, "courts should require the greatest
specificity that is possible under the circumstances, but should
recognize that circumstances may often make it impossible to list
in detail every item that is to be seized."248 Of the requirement
that the place be described, the Joint Statement explains,
"[C]ourts should ... be flexible in applying this requirement, but
should require as great a degree of specificity as is possible under
nature of the proceedings intended by the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution under the terms 'unreasonable searches and seizures,' it is
only necessary to recall the contemporary or then recent history of the
controversies on the subject, both in this country and in England. The
practice had obtained in the colonies of issuing writs of assistance to the
revenue officers, empowering them, in this discretion, to search suspected
places for smuggled goods, which James Otis pronounced 'the worst
instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty, and
the fundamental principles of law, that ever was found in an English law
book,' since they placed 'the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty
officer.'"
Id. (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 625 (1886)).
24 State v. Muldowney, 292 A.2d 26, 29 (N.J. 1972).
The evil inherent in a warrant which vests the executing officer with so
broad a discretion as he had here is evident. The warrant leaves the
protection of the constitutional rights afforded the person to be searched to
the whim of that officer. We do not mean to suggest, however, that a
minute and detailed description of the items to be seized is necessary. But
the warrant must be sufficiently definite so that the officer executing it can
identify the property sought with reasonable certainty.
Id.
245 Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931); WAYNE R.
LAFAVE ET AL., 2 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.4(f) (3d ed. 2007).
246 15 U.S.C.A. § 1116(d)(5)(B) (West 2009).
247 Id.
248 130 CONG. REC. H12076, H12081 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1984), reprinted in J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, 7 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, app.
A8, at 20 (4th ed. West 2009).
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the circumstances, and should not grant orders, for example,
permitting seizure to take place 'anywhere in downtown
Washington, DC.' "249
Every court to address the issue has held that "[tlhe 1984
Amendments to the Lanham Act are constitutional under the
Fourth Amendment."25 ° However, the Trademark Counterfeiting
Act, "must be construed in accordance with the Constitution-the
statute itself may pass constitutional muster, but clearly it may
not be applied in an unconstitutional manner."251 The example
from the legislative history, an order permitting seizure
"anywhere in downtown Washington, DC," is clearly a
misapplication of the Trademark Counterfeiting Act and a
violation of the Fourth Amendment, but where are the
boundaries in less obvious cases? Luckily, district court judges
have a great deal of practice in the criminal context in
determining when a seizure is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. It may be, however, that courts are not thinking in
terms of the Fourth Amendment when presented with
applications for seizure orders under the Trademark
Counterfeiting Act.
Using NASCAR again as an example, its application for a
TRO and seizure order attempted to address the particularity
requirement by (1) stating the kinds of things counterfeiters have
sold in past years;252 and (2) providing a list of all of NASCAR's
249 Id.
250 Time Warner Entm't Co. v. Does, 876 F. Supp. 407, 412 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); see
NBA Props. v. Does, No. 97-4069, 1997 WL 271311, at *1 (10th Cir. May 21, 1997);
Gucci Am., Inc. v. Accents, 955 F. Supp. 279, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that a
party has not violated the Fourth Amendment when "all the careful requirements
for issuance of the seizure orders were met"); Reebok Int'l Ltd. v. Su Youn Pak, 683
F. Supp. 929, 930 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); 4 Louis ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN
ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS & MONOPOLIES § 22:53 (4th ed. 2008) ("The
counterfeiting amendments to the Lanham Act have been held constitutional under
the Fourth Amendment... "); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 5 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 30:37 (4th ed. 2009) ("The ex parte seizure provisions of
the 1984 Counterfeiting Act have been held not to be in violation of the Fourth
Amendment ban on unreasonable searches and seizures.").
251 Time Warner Entm't, 876 F. Supp. at 412; see 4 ALTMAN & POLLACK, supra
note 250, § 22:53 ("[The Fourth Amendment is violated if the premises to be
searched, or the articles to be seized, are not described with particularity."); 5
MCCARTHY, supra note 250, § 30:37 ("[A] particular seizure order may violate the
Fourth Amendment if it is too broad and sweeping in scope.").
'
52Complaint 43, Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc. v. Does, 584 F.
Supp. 2d 824 (W.D.N.C. 2008) (No. 3:08-cv-44); Ex Parte Application for Temporary
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registered and unregistered marks,5 3 with the implication that
an unlicensed dealer selling anything on that list must be selling
counterfeit goods. There are problems with both of these
approaches.
The problem with attempting to satisfy particularity with
occurrences from years past is made amply clear by an example
from the criminal context. One can imagine the treatment the
government would receive if it sought a search warrant for a
particular residence relying upon an officer's affidavit that last
year the residence was used to sell cocaine and the government
strongly suspected that it would be used for the same purpose
this year. It is hard to imagine a judge that would grant such a
warrant, even for what was, in years past, the most notorious of
drug houses without more timely evidence. The predictable
seasons and events of NASCAR and other live events are
somewhat different from this example, but the underlying
problem is the same: Events in years past may not provide a
constitutionally reasonable basis for a seizure order; they are
simply too remote. "It is... fundamental that the element of
time is crucial to the concept of probable cause."254 While
"[p]robable cause 'is not determined by merely counting the
number of days between the time of the facts relied upon and the
Restraining Order and Order for Seizure of Counterfeit Marked Goods 3, 12, Nat'l
Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc. v. Does, (W.D.N.C. 2008) (No. 3:08-cv-44).
Based on past experiences set forth below, [NASCAR] reasonably believe [s]
that Defendants, whose identities and precise whereabouts are currently
unknown to [NASCAR], will be selling at NASCAR Races throughout the
country Counterfeit Merchandise ....
The Prior Seizure Orders enabled [NASCAR] effectively to police
distribution and sale of Counterfeit Merchandise throughout the 2001,
2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007 seasons. The Defendants' conduct,
however, represents a continuing problem, not yet abated, and the only
effective relief available to [NASCAR] is the ex parte seizure process.
Id. (first emphasis added).
2-3 See Complaint, Exhibit 1-2, Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc. v.
Does, 584 F. Supp. 2d 824 (W.D.N.C. 2008) (No. 3:08-cv-44) (consisting of thirty,
single-spaced pages of NASCAR and its coplaintiffs' registered and unregistered
marks); Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Order for
Seizure of Counterfeit Marked Goods, Exhibit 1-2, Natl Ass'n for Stock Car Auto
Racing, Inc. v. Does, (W.D.N.C. 2008) (No. 3:08-cv-44) (providing the same list as the
complaint).
11 United States v. Johnson, 461 F.2d 285, 287 (10th Cir. 1972).
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warrant's issuance,' "2155 it is uncertain whether this principle can
be extended to facts that took place years ago. It is true,
however, that "where the affidavit properly recites facts
indicating activity of a protracted and continuous nature, a
course of conduct, the passage of time becomes less significant."
256
It may be that a showing of continuous criminal activity, year
after year, event after event, is sufficient for probable cause to be
reasonably based on activity from prior years.257  Such a
standard, however, greatly reduces the importance of the
temporal element from a probable cause determination."'
Not only must the facts establishing probable cause be
reasonably fresh at the time the seizure order is issued, but the
warrant must be executed before probable cause has gone stale.
To the extent that a seizure order is construed as a purely in
personam device being used to collect and preserve evidence,
analogous to a criminal search warrant, staleness is a looming
problem. Criminal search warrants become stale with the
passage of time, which is why Rule 41(e)(2)(i) or the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that they be executed
within ten days time, and, arguably, why Congress placed a
similar seven-day temporal restriction on the execution of § 1116
255 2 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 245, § 3.3(g) (quoting United States v. Rahn, 511
F.2d 290, 292 (10th Cir. 1975)).
25 Johnson, 461 F.2d at 287; see also 2 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 245, § 3.3(g).
257 This may be what NASCAR had in mind when it stated, "The Defendants'
conduct... represents a continuing problem, not yet abated, and the only effective
relief available to [NASCAR] is the ex parte seizure process." Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Entry of Default Judgment for Forfeiture of Seized Counterfeit
Goods and for Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice as to All Other Claims 2,
Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc, v. Does, 584 F. Supp. 2d 824 (W.D.N.C.
2008) (No. 3:08-cv-44).
2-8 A less dubious practice would be for a trademark plaintiff to obtain fresh
intelligence that counterfeit goods are being offered for sale at a particular venue
and then to seek an emergency seizure order based on this information. While such a
practice might seem impractical given the snail's pace with which many civil dockets
proceed, nothing in the statute would seem to prohibit an on-duty magistrate judge
from making the probable cause determination as is routinely done for criminal
warrants, provided at least that the district judge has made the determination that
the other preconditions for a seizure order exist. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (2006)
("[A] judge may designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine any pretrial
matter pending before the court, except a motion for injunctive relief.. .
(emphasis added).
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seizure orders.25 19 As Lanham Act litigation evolves to look more
like a substantive, in rem remedy, with the seizure order
analogous to a criminal arrest warrant, the issue of staleness
drops from the picture. "The probable cause to support issuance
of an arrest warrant normally would not grow stale as easily as
that which supports a warrant to search a particular place for
particular objects."2 60  This is because once there is probable
cause to believe someone is a felon, the passage of time will not
erase the fact that the felony has been committed. Thus, the only
way an arrest warrant can go stale is if the information that
originally established probable cause has become discredited in
the course of an investigation.26' Similarly, there is ample
support for the idea that "time and thereby staleness is not
material because in rem forfeitures are based on the 'taint' theory
and time cannot remove taint."262 Thus, to the extent that a
seizure order is justified as an arrest in rem, staleness is not an
obstacle to delayed execution of the warrant so long as fresh
probable cause existed at the time the seizure order issued.
NASCAR's list of its registered and unregistered marks is
arguably more problematic, as it is not in any way particularized.
At first blush, it is tempting to say that a more particular list
cannot be found; every single one of NASCAR's protected marks
is listed therein, so the seizure order necessarily covers all
eventually seized items. The tautological nature of such a
response, however, is the classic problem of overbreadth.
Another example from criminal law demonstrates the problem:
A warrant for the seizure of drugs cannot simply list the
substances in all five schedules of the Controlled Substances
Act.263 Such a list, while certainly exhaustive of any illegal drugs
259 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(i); 15 U.S.C.A. § 1116(d)(5)(C) (West 2009). See
generally 2 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 245, § 3.3(g); United States v. Bedford, 519
F.2d 650, 655-56 n.14 (3d Cir. 1975).
260 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 432 n.5 (1976).
261 See id.
262 WILLIAMS & WHITNEY, supra note 8, § 13.7.1.4; see United States v. Kemp,
690 F.2d 397, 402 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding that "contemporaneity of events
establishing probable cause" is not required for a seizure under 21 U.S.C. § 881 as
long as the property in question has been used in violation of the drug laws). But see
United States v. 28 Emery St., 914 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting that there was a
.question of the staleness of the information" despite the fact that the action was for
an in rem forfeiture).
263 See 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2006); cf United States v. Greene, 250 F.3d 471, 478
(6th Cir. 2001).
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law enforcement might find, tells the court nothing about
probable cause. Likewise, NASCAR and other trademark owners
provide little to no useful information when they provide a list of
all of their registered and unregistered marks, stating that some
or all of them may be counterfeited during live events.
As far as location is concerned, NASCAR's application for the
seizure order states that counterfeit merchandise is usually sold
within a ten-mile radius of its events. The seizure order granted
by the court, therefore, provides that any counterfeit goods may
be seized within ten miles of a NASCAR event.264 Using
elementary principles of geometry, each NASCAR seizure order
was in effect for 314.14 square miles.265  Interestingly,
Washington, D.C., has an area of 68.2 square miles. Clearly,
Congress's example was geared towards generality in
description, not sheer size, but the fact that the NASCAR seizure
order for each and every event was more than four times the size
of Congress's example bears mentioning. And this is just the size
for one event. The court's seizure order was in effect for the
entirety of NASCAR's season, which, in 2008, consisted of ninety-
seven races.2 6 Thus, the total area covered by the court's order
was 30,471.58 square miles, an area roughly the size of South
Carolina.267
It may be tempting to note that in other in rem forfeiture
contexts, a probable cause showing is not required before the
seizure but may be made after the seizure has taken place.268
264 See Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc. v. Does, 584 F. Supp. 2d 824,
827, (W.D.N.C. 2008).
265 The area of a circle is equal to n multiplied by the circle's radius squared.
26 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
267 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUICKFACTS, http://quickfacts.
census.gov/qfd/states/45000.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2009).
26 See United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 56 (2d Cir. 1993), superseded by
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1) (2006), as recognized in United States v. Mondragon,
313 F.3d 862, 865 (4th Cir. 2002).
The machinery of our civil forfeiture laws permits the government to seize
property without probable cause, institute a civil forfeiture proceeding, and
then use civil discovery as a means of accessing information necessary to
effect a forfeiture. Because the final probable-cause determination rests on
information presented in the forfeiture action, the risk to claimants of being
deprived of their property is extremely high. Despite this apparent
unfairness, the precedents of this court and the Supreme Court, as well as
the relevant statutes and rules, seem to require this result. At this point in
the development of forfeiture law, any change in the balance of this unique
procedural system must come either from the Supreme Court or from
congress.
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However, this methodology of acquiring probable cause after
seizure is inapplicable for two reasons. First, the Trademark
Counterfeiting Act simply does not allow this sequence of events
that other forfeiture statutes have explicitly created. The Act
requires that the "likelihood of success" showing be made before,
not after, the seizure.26 9 Second, there are clear public policy
reasons for limiting what civil litigants can seize, on an ex parte
basis, from each another. One can imagine the utter chaos that
might ensue if civil litigants, who are often contumacious in the
course of discovery, were permitted to seize property from one
another, claiming that they would be able to meet the probable
cause standard after the seizures. It is for these reasons that
Congress required that the standard be met before the seizure
order issues and, incidentally, why Congress required the party
applying for the order to post a bond and risk punitive damages
in the event of a wrongful seizure. °
One may, at this point, contend that these problems with
NASCAR's application for a seizure order have nothing to do
with the Trademark Counterfeiting Act's in rem or in personam
nature. In fact, these problems are caused by the very evolution
of the seizure order from a temporally limited evidentiary
mechanism attendant to an in personam action into a
substantive remedy that is more about the marks than the
person, and is, therefore, more in the nature of an in rem action.
If NASCAR, or any other trademark owner who travels from one
event to the next, were to obtain a separate and discrete order for
each event, based upon independent probable cause and for the
purpose of preserving evidence, these problems would fade away.
Particular descriptions of what was at each event could be
provided; each seizure order would be far more limited in
geographic scope than the singular order in NASCAR's case; and
each seizure order would be supported by fresh probable cause,
not removed from the issuance of the order by a period of several
months or even years.
Id. But see 2 FED. R. CIv. P., R. CMT, APP. C SUPP. R. G(3)(b) (stating that a court
must still find probable cause to issue a warrant for the arrest of forfeitable personal
property if it is not already "in the government's possession, custody or control and is
not subject to a judicial restraining order").
269 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1116(d)(4)(B)(iii) (West 2009).
270 Id. § 1116(d)(5)(D), (d)(11).
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Thus, one can see that it is not the seizure order per se that
poses a Fourth Amendment problem, but the seizure order qua
substantive, in rem remedy that tends to run afoul of the Fourth
Amendment's requirements. When seizure orders are broadly
described and expansive in both geographic and temporal scope,
they lose particularity in description of both thing and place, and
the probable cause that supports them becomes more and more
stale. NASCAR's most recent order lasted ten months and was
used to seize over 18,000 items. 1 Other orders have lasted
longer, some with no end in sight.27 2 These kinds of orders can
hardly be said to be about the person; they have become almost
solely about the thing-about hunting down and removing
counterfeit marks from the marketplace. This new, in rem aspect
of the Trademark Counterfeit Act is something Congress did not
intend and did not plan for. Thus, the protections meant to serve
particularity and other Fourth Amendment safeguards have
ceased to be effective in ensuring constitutional compliance.
CONCLUSION
It is abundantly clear from the language of the Lanham Act,
the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, and the attendant
legislative history that Congress's goal in modifying the civil
counterfeiting action was to facilitate the collection of monetary
damages. The relevant statutes are written in terms of personal
liability in the form of injunctive and monetary relief, and the
legislative history reaffirms these remedies as the logical
conclusion of a counterfeiting action. It is equally clear from both
statute and legislative history that the ex parte seizure order was
only intended to be an evidentiary tool to facilitate the collection
of damages. After all, a trademark owner cannot recover
damages from a counterfeiter, treble or otherwise, if there is no
evidence of counterfeit activity. Ample case law and testimony
before Congress made it clear that counterfeiters were either
destroying or concealing evidence of their behavior the moment
they were placed on notice of court proceedings. So, in order to
271 See supra note 23.
272 For example, the court in SKS Merch, LLC. v. Barry, granted a permanent
injunction, which by its very nature carries on until court action dissolves or
modifies it, and stated that the injunction "may be enforced by the seizure of any
[counterfeit] merchandise." 233 F. Supp. 2d 841, 853 (E.D. Ky. 2002); see also Baker,
supra note 34, at 382-85.
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preserve evidence of counterfeit activity and damages, Congress
created the ex parte seizure order. This new seizure order,
powerful tool that it was, was not without limitation. Congress
created a substantial number of prerequisites to ensure that the
Fourth Amendment and Due Process Clause were not infringed.
In addition, Congress expressly stated that the seizure order
would last no more than seven days.27 3
The seizure order, however, has long since left many of these
limitations behind. Applications for lengthy seizure orders meet
only the very broadest definitions of particularity, if at all. The
extended life span of a single seizure order means that the
probable cause upon which later seizures rely may have long
since gone stale. Incredibly, courts seem all too willing to ignore
the express limitation of Congress that seizure orders last only
seven days, extending them for weeks, months, and even years. 4
Along this evolutionary path, the seizure order has gone from
being a tool to facilitate the collection and presentation of
evidence for trial, culminating in an award of monetary damages,
to the ultimate remedy in and of itself.
It is at this point that the much-discussed in rem/in
personam distinction becomes relevant. Although Congress's
intentions manifestly ran along in personam lines, it is equally
manifest that the modern seizure order, no longer a simple tool
in the in personam kit, but now an entire remedy unto itself, is
something more. The seizure and destruction of counterfeit
marks are the first and last goals of trademark owners in the
majority of counterfeit actions. The counterfeiter, along with any
judgment for injunctive relief and monetary damages against
him, has dropped out of this picture. Indeed, with the average
seller of counterfeit goods refusing service and leaving the scene
immediately upon being approached, he was hardly ever in the
picture to begin with. What courts are left with, then, is
something Congress clearly did not anticipate: They are left not
with the person but with the thing. It is the thing that is the
273 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(5)(C); 130 CONG. REC. H12076, H12081 (daily ed. Oct. 10,
1984), reprinted in J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 7 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION app. A8, at 20 (4th ed. West 2009) ("Under proposed
subsection (d)(5)(C), the court must indicate the period during which the seizure
order is to be carried out-a period that may not be longer than 7 days." (emphasis
added)).
274 See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc. v. Does, 584 F. Supp. 2d
824, 827 n.6 (W.D.N.C. 2008).
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wrongdoer, the thing that is seized and proceeded against, and
the thing that courts act against by ordering the goods to be
either destroyed or partially cured and donated to charity. There
is an age-old definition for an action against the thing: In rem.
So it is that courts in civil counterfeiting actions, whether they
are aware of it or not, are confronted with something akin to an
in rem action.
Despite the fact that counterfeiting actions and their seizure
orders bear several indicia of an in rem action, they also retain
certain in personam qualities. 5 Courts, therefore, are presented
with both in personam and in rem components in a single action.
This dual nature is not unprecedented. After all, Justice Story
recognized that "[m]any cases exist, where there is both a
forfeiture in rem and a personal penalty."2 76  In reality, this
situation is not extraordinarily difficult as long as courts know
what to look for. Certainly, there remain some cases in which
damages are actually collectible. For these cases, the
counterfeiter himself remains an integral part of the action, and
the traditional model, with its in personam procedures and
remedies, is sufficient. However, for the remainder of cases-
those in which the counterfeiter is a nominal player at best and
the real subject of the action is the counterfeit mark-courts
must be aware of the consequences of an in rem action. The most
obvious consequences are those relating to due process. Notice
and opportunity to be heard must be given to more than just the
original possessors of the counterfeit goods, as the judgment
against those goods, and their eventual destruction, "binds the
whole world and not just the persons who are served, receive
275 After all, the original complaint and application for seizure order are brought
against a person, usually the ubiquitous "John or Jane Doe."
276 The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14 (1827). However, it is not always the
case that in personam and in rem remedies are harmonious. See Alitalia-Linee Aeree
Italiane S.p.A. v. Casinoalitalia.Com, 128 F. Supp. 2d 340, 344 (E.D. Va. 2001).
[T]he [Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act] provides mark owners
with two mutually exclusive avenues for relief against putative infringers.
A mark owner may proceed either in personam against an infringer or, in
certain circumstances where this cannot be done, the owner may proceed in
rem against the domain name; a mark owner may not proceed against both
at the same time.
Id. Congress not having addressed the issue as it relates to the Trademark
Counterfeiting Act, it is not clear whether the in personam and in rem remedies
could be pursued simultaneously or whether they would be exclusive.
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actual notice, or enter an appearance."277  There are also
significant Fourth Amendment consequences as actions revolving
solely around the seizure and destruction of goods make the
requirements of particularity and timeliness more important
than ever.
As the situation stands today, courts roundly ignore the
consequences of the evolved seizure order as something akin to
an in rem action to the detriment both of defendants' Fourth
Amendment rights and of the due process rights of those
potential property owners who remain unknown to the court.
Trademark owners and the intellectual property bar cannot be
blamed for this evolution; they are merely taking what is, in the
words of NASCAR, "the only effective relief available"27 in their
fight against counterfeiters and zealously advocating the
expansion of that form of relief.2 79 It is courts that have allowed
the seizure process to evolve beyond its original in personam
moorings into the realm of in rem without creating standards to
keep pace, and it is courts that are responsible for upholding
constitutional protections like the Fourth Amendment and the
Due Process Clause.
The court in NASCAR v. Does recognized some of the
problems the modern in rem seizure order poses and attempted
to deal with them by incorporating the Supplemental Rules and
their procedures for providing notice in an in rem forfeiture
277 WILLIAMS & WHITNEY, supra note 8, § 13.6, at 722; see also The Mary, 13
U.S. (9 Cranch) 126, 144 (1815) ("The whole world, it is said, are parties in an
admiralty cause; and, therefore, the whole world is bound by the decision.").
278 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Entry of Default Judgment for
Forfeiture of Seized Counterfeit Goods and for Voluntary Dismissal Without
Prejudice as to All Other Claims 2, Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc, v.
Does, 584 F. Supp. 2d 824 (W.D.N.C. 2008) (No. 3:08-cv-44).
279 However, there are undoubtedly those who would like to see many of the
limitations placed on counterfeiting actions, both private and governmental,
removed, and would have little patience for the constitutional safeguards discussed
here. See, e.g., David J. Kera & Theodore H. Davis, Jr., The Fifty-Seventh Year of
Administration of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 95 TRADEMARK REP. 5, 173
(2005) ("Opinions placing barriers to the ability of the government to battle
trademark counterfeiting have become a minor cottage industry among federal
courts, and cases over the past year did nothing to buck that trend."). Others, in
contrast, have spoken strongly in favor of increased constitutional standards in civil
forfeitures. See, e.g., Schwarcz & Rothman, supra note 53, at 287 ("We continue to be
enormously troubled by the government's increasing and virtually unchecked use of
the civil forfeiture statutes and the disregard for due process that is buried in those
statutes." (quoting United States v. All Assets of Statewide Auto Parts, Inc., 971
F.2d 896, 905 (2d Cir. 1992))).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
action. This is one possibility. There are sure to be others.
There is, for example, another section of the Lanham Act that
Congress has revised to deal with the modern realities of
trademark infringement: The Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act.2"' That Act expressly states that "[t]he owner of a
mark may file an in rem civil action" to preserve its
trademarks.28' Congress created this in rem action "for the
purpose of providing remedies for trademark owners who cannot
find a person or entity responsible for registering the offending
domain names."282 The Senate Judiciary Committee report,
under the heading "In rem jurisdiction," further explains why
Congress felt the creation of an in rem action was necessary:
A significant problem faced by trademark owners in the fight
against cybersquatting is the fact that many cybersquatters
register domain names under aliases or otherwise provide false
information in their registration applications in order to avoid
identification and service of process by the mark owner. The
bill, as amended, will alleviate this difficulty, while protecting
the notions of fair play and substantial justice, by enabling a
mark owner to seek an injunction against the infringing
property in those cases where, after due diligence, a mark
owner is unable to proceed against the domain name registrant
because the registrant has provided false contact information
and is otherwise not to be found.283
280 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d) (West 2009).
281 Id. § 1125(d)(2)(A).
282 Volkswagen, AG v. Volkswagentalk.Com, 584 F. Supp. 2d 879, 882 (E.D. Va.
2008).
283 S. REP. No. 106-140, at 10 (1999); see also Beverly A. Berneman, Navigating
the Bankruptcy Waters in a Domain Name Rowboat, 3 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 61, 78 (2003).
In response to the inability to gain personal jurisdiction over illusive
cybersquatters, Congress included in rem actions against the domain name
itself
In rem proceedings allow the owner of a trademark to avoid the necessity
of identifying and service of process upon a cybersquatter who deliberately
has made himself untraceable.
Id.; John A. Greer, Note, If the Shoe Fits: Reconciling the International Shoe
Minimum Contacts Test with the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 61
VAND. L. REV. 1861, 1863-64 (2008) ("In response to these growing concerns [of the
unavailability of in personam jurisdiction and trademark law's ineffectiveness],
Congress enacted the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act ("ACPA"), which
plaintiffs have used several times in exactly these types of actions-including in
GlobalSantaFe-in an attempt to rein in cybersquatting." (footnotes omitted)); Note,
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The situation faced by victims of cybersquatting is strikingly
similar to that faced by trademark owners in the traditional
counterfeiting context. Just as cybersquatters are often
impossible to locate and bring to justice, the prospect of brining a
modern counterfeiter into court and collecting monetary damages
is often a practical impossibility. The only meaningful difference
is that the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act is a
twenty-first-century response to a twenty-first-century problem.
Ideally, Congress would amend the Trademark Counterfeiting
Act to expressly create an in rem cause of action, in addition to
the existing in personam remedies, and state the procedures
that apply. In the meantime, the principles from the Anti-
cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act could be used to inform
trademark owners and courts as to the necessary procedures in
what have become in rem actions under the Trademark
Counterfeiting Act.2'8
A "Category-Specific" Legislative Approach to the Internet Personal Jurisdiction
Problem in U.S. Law, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1617, 1631 (2004).
ITihe ACPA incorporated as part of its remedial scheme a unique
jurisdictional stipulation that one might characterize as Congress's first
stab at a category-specific approach to Internet jurisdiction: in actions
against defendants for whom in personam jurisdiction is not obtainable, the
ACPA provides for in rem jurisdiction over 'a domain name in the judicial
district in which the domain name registrar, domain name registry, or
other domain name authority that registered or assigned the domain name
is located.' Thus, the ACPA effectively guarantees a forum to victims of
cybersquatting by granting jurisdiction to the domain name registrar's
situs state when the alleged cyberpirate cannot be located or subjected to
personal jurisdiction in the United States. This approach indicates
Congress's determination to use jurisdictional policy to stamp out the
harmful effects of cybersquatting, as well as Congress's quite literal view of
domain names as a type of property to be protected.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
2 This is not to say that incorporating certain procedures from the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act into the Trademark Counterfeiting Act
would not be problematic, as the provisions of the former have come under some
intense scrutiny. See, e.g., David S. Magier, Comment, Tick, Tock, Time Is Running
out To Nab Cybersquatters: The Dwindling Utility of the Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act, 46 IDEA 415, 417 (2006) ("Congress's response to the
jurisdictional challenges involved with prosecuting the misuse of trademarks as
Internet domain names, the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act... raises
significant constitutional and international concerns in the short term and will be
wholly ineffective in the long term." (footnotes omitted)); Michael P. Allen, In Rem
Jurisdiction from Pennoyer to Shaffer to the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection
Act, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 243, 244 (2002).
The in rem provisions [in the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act]
raise an important question concerning the scope of the Due Process
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We are certainly not the first commentators to argue for the
explicit creation of in rem jurisdiction in an area of the law.285
Such arguments are not surprising given the fact that in rem
jurisdiction was "developed primarily to expand the reach of the
courts and to furnish remedies for aggrieved parties.""6 The
situation here is not so aggressive in that it does not call for new
kinds of jurisdiction; courts are already exercising de facto in rem
jurisdiction over counterfeit marks. Action by Congress in this
area would simply legitimize what courts are already doing and
would, more importantly, provide courts with a clear and uniform
process to follow.
Other possible avenues surely exist. Fortunately, federal
courts are well equipped to discover these options and to
safeguard constitutional rights. They must, of course, first
recognize the problem and take it upon themselves to be the voice
of caution concerning these rights. If they do not, the very
nature of the modern counterfeiting action, as an action against
the thing without the presence of an in personam defendant,
virtually ensures that there will be no adversarial process to do it
for them.
protections afforded by the Constitution to a nonresident defendant .... A
consideration of the ACPA's in rem provisions leads to a broader discussion
of whether in rem jurisdiction continues to have any place in modern day
jurisdictional doctrine.
Id.
285 See, e.g., Patrick C. Reed, Expanding the Jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of
International Trade: Proposals by the Customs and International Trade Bar
Association, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 819, 820 (2001) ("The [U.S. Court of International
Trade] should be given in rem jurisdiction to hear forfeiture cases arising from the
Customs Service's seizure of goods[,] . . . [including the seizure ofi counterfeit
trademarks.").
28 Republic Nat'l Bank of Miami v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, 87 (1992).
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